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Message-ID: <aKOE1aqe6EljRkuB@e129823.arm.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 20:53:57 +0100
From: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@....com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: will@...nel.org, broonie@...nel.org, maz@...nel.org,
oliver.upton@...ux.dev, shameerali.kolothum.thodi@...wei.com,
joey.gouly@....com, james.morse@....com, ardb@...nel.org,
scott@...amperecomputing.com, suzuki.poulose@....com,
yuzenghui@...wei.com, mark.rutland@....com,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] arm64: futex: support futex with FEAT_LSUI
Hi Catalin,
> On Sat, Aug 16, 2025 at 03:57:49PM +0100, Yeoreum Yun wrote:
> > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_HAS_LSUI
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#define __LSUI_PREAMBLE ".arch_extension lsui\n"
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#define LSUI_FUTEX_ATOMIC_OP(op, asm_op, mb) \
> > > > > +static __always_inline int \
> > > > > +__lsui_futex_atomic_##op(int oparg, u32 __user *uaddr, int *oval) \
> > > > > +{ \
> > > > > + int ret = 0; \
> > > > > + int val; \
> > > > > + \
> > > > > + mte_enable_tco(); \
> > > >
> > >
> > > > The reason uaccess_disable_privileged() sets the MTE TCO (tag check
> > > > override) is because the user and the kernel may have different settings
> > > > for tag checking. If we use the user instructions provided by FEAT_LSUI,
> > > > we leave the MTE checking as is.
> > > >
> > > > The same comment for all the other functions here.
> > >
> > > You're right. Thanks for catching this :)
> >
> > But one bikeshedding question.
> > why we need to care about the different settings for tag checking when
> > we use uaccess_disable_privileged()?
>
> Because, for example, the user may not be interested in any tag check
> faults (has checking disabled) but the kernel uses KASAN with
> synchronous tag check faults. If it uses the privileged instructions as
> in the futex API, it either won't make progress or report errors to the
> user which it does not expect.
>
> > IIUC, the reason we uses to uaccess_disaable_privileged() to access
> > user memory with copy_from/to_user() and etc.
>
> We don't use uaccess_disable_privileged() with copy_from_user() since
> those use the unprivileged instructions already.
Thanks for your explaination :)
>
> > But, although tag check fault happens in kernel side,
> > It seems to be handled by fixup code if user address is wrong.
>
> The user may know it is wrong and not care (e.g. one wants to keep using
> a buggy application).
Then Does this example -- ignoring wrong and keep using a buggy
application shows us that we need to enable TCO when
we runs the LSUI instruction?
AFAIK, LSUI instruction also check memory tag -- i.e) ldtadd.
if passed user address which has unmatched tag and if user isn't
interested in tah check, It can meet the unexpected report from KASAN.
Am I missing something?
--
Sincerely,
Yeoreum Yun
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