linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv6 perf/core 10/22] uprobes/x86: Add support to optimize uprobes

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Message-ID: <9ece46a40ae89925312398780c3bc3518f229aff.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2025 15:58:14 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "jolsa@...nel.org" <jolsa@...nel.org>, "peterz@...radead.org"
	<peterz@...radead.org>
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Subject: Re: [PATCHv6 perf/core 10/22] uprobes/x86: Add support to optimize
 uprobes

I'm not sure we should optimize for shadow stack yet. Unless it's easy to think
about... (below)

On Wed, 2025-08-20 at 14:30 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksi
>  int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
>  int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
>  bool shstk_is_enabled(void);
> +int shstk_pop(u64 *val);
> +int shstk_push(u64 val);
>  #else
>  static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
>  			       unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
> @@ -35,6 +37,8 @@ static inline int setup_signal_shadow_st
>  static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
>  static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
>  static inline bool shstk_is_enabled(void) { return false; }
> +static inline int shstk_pop(u64 *val) { return -ENOTSUPP; }
> +static inline int shstk_push(u64 val) { return -ENOTSUPP; }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
>  
>  #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -246,6 +246,46 @@ static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr
>  	return ssp;
>  }
>  
> +int shstk_pop(u64 *val)
> +{
> +	int ret = 0;
> +	u64 ssp;
> +
> +	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
> +		return -ENOTSUPP;
> +
> +	fpregs_lock_and_load();
> +
> +	rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +	if (val && get_user(*val, (__user u64 *)ssp))
> +	    ret = -EFAULT;
> +	ssp += SS_FRAME_SIZE;
> +	wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +
> +	fpregs_unlock();
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +int shstk_push(u64 val)
> +{
> +	u64 ssp;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
> +		return -ENOTSUPP;
> +
> +	fpregs_lock_and_load();
> +
> +	rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +	ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
> +	wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +	ret = write_user_shstk_64((__user void *)ssp, val);

Should we role back ssp if there is a fault?

> +	fpregs_unlock();
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  #define SHSTK_DATA_BIT BIT(63)
>  
>  static int put_shstk_data(u64 __user *addr, u64 data)
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> @@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uprobe)
>  {
>  	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
>  	struct uprobe_syscall_args args;
> -	unsigned long ip, sp;
> +	unsigned long ip, sp, sret;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	/* Allow execution only from uprobe trampolines. */
> @@ -831,6 +831,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uprobe)
>  
>  	sp = regs->sp;
>  
> +	if (shstk_pop(&sret) == 0 && sret != args.retaddr)
> +		goto sigill;
> +
>  	handle_syscall_uprobe(regs, regs->ip);
>  
>  	/*
> @@ -855,6 +858,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uprobe)
>  	if (args.retaddr - 5 != regs->ip)
>  		args.retaddr = regs->ip;
>  
> +	if (shstk_push(args.retaddr) == -EFAULT)
> +		goto sigill;
> +

Are we effectively allowing arbitrary shadow stack push here? I see we need to
be in in_uprobe_trampoline(), but there is no mmap lock taken, so it's a racy
check. I'm questioning if the security posture tweak is worth thinking about for
whatever the level of intersection of uprobes usage and shadow stack is today.

>  	regs->ip = ip;
>  
>  	err = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, &args, sizeof(args));
> @@ -1124,14 +1130,6 @@ void arch_uprobe_optimize(struct arch_up
>  	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
>  	uprobe_opcode_t insn[5];
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * Do not optimize if shadow stack is enabled, the return address hijack
> -	 * code in arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr updates wrong frame when
> -	 * the entry uprobe is optimized and the shadow stack crashes the app.
> -	 */
> -	if (shstk_is_enabled())
> -		return;
> -
>  	if (!should_optimize(auprobe))
>  		return;
>