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Message-ID: <20250820123033.GL3245006@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2025 14:30:33 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@...cle.com>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Thomas Weißschuh <thomas@...ch.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCHv6 perf/core 10/22] uprobes/x86: Add support to optimize
uprobes
On Tue, Aug 19, 2025 at 09:15:15PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 20, 2025 at 01:21:20PM +0200, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> > +void arch_uprobe_optimize(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, unsigned long vaddr)
> > +{
> > + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> > + uprobe_opcode_t insn[5];
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Do not optimize if shadow stack is enabled, the return address hijack
> > + * code in arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr updates wrong frame when
> > + * the entry uprobe is optimized and the shadow stack crashes the app.
> > + */
> > + if (shstk_is_enabled())
> > + return;
>
> Kernel should be able to fix up userspace shadow stack just fine.
>
> > + if (!should_optimize(auprobe))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + mmap_write_lock(mm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Check if some other thread already optimized the uprobe for us,
> > + * if it's the case just go away silently.
> > + */
> > + if (copy_from_vaddr(mm, vaddr, &insn, 5))
> > + goto unlock;
> > + if (!is_swbp_insn((uprobe_opcode_t*) &insn))
> > + goto unlock;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If we fail to optimize the uprobe we set the fail bit so the
> > + * above should_optimize will fail from now on.
> > + */
> > + if (__arch_uprobe_optimize(auprobe, mm, vaddr))
> > + set_bit(ARCH_UPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_FAIL, &auprobe->flags);
> > +
> > +unlock:
> > + mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> > +}
Something a little like this should do I suppose...
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksi
int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
bool shstk_is_enabled(void);
+int shstk_pop(u64 *val);
+int shstk_push(u64 val);
#else
static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -35,6 +37,8 @@ static inline int setup_signal_shadow_st
static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
static inline bool shstk_is_enabled(void) { return false; }
+static inline int shstk_pop(u64 *val) { return -ENOTSUPP; }
+static inline int shstk_push(u64 val) { return -ENOTSUPP; }
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -246,6 +246,46 @@ static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr
return ssp;
}
+int shstk_pop(u64 *val)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u64 ssp;
+
+ if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ fpregs_lock_and_load();
+
+ rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+ if (val && get_user(*val, (__user u64 *)ssp))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ ssp += SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+ wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+
+ fpregs_unlock();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int shstk_push(u64 val)
+{
+ u64 ssp;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ fpregs_lock_and_load();
+
+ rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+ ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+ wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+ ret = write_user_shstk_64((__user void *)ssp, val);
+ fpregs_unlock();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#define SHSTK_DATA_BIT BIT(63)
static int put_shstk_data(u64 __user *addr, u64 data)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uprobe)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
struct uprobe_syscall_args args;
- unsigned long ip, sp;
+ unsigned long ip, sp, sret;
int err;
/* Allow execution only from uprobe trampolines. */
@@ -831,6 +831,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uprobe)
sp = regs->sp;
+ if (shstk_pop(&sret) == 0 && sret != args.retaddr)
+ goto sigill;
+
handle_syscall_uprobe(regs, regs->ip);
/*
@@ -855,6 +858,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uprobe)
if (args.retaddr - 5 != regs->ip)
args.retaddr = regs->ip;
+ if (shstk_push(args.retaddr) == -EFAULT)
+ goto sigill;
+
regs->ip = ip;
err = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, &args, sizeof(args));
@@ -1124,14 +1130,6 @@ void arch_uprobe_optimize(struct arch_up
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
uprobe_opcode_t insn[5];
- /*
- * Do not optimize if shadow stack is enabled, the return address hijack
- * code in arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr updates wrong frame when
- * the entry uprobe is optimized and the shadow stack crashes the app.
- */
- if (shstk_is_enabled())
- return;
-
if (!should_optimize(auprobe))
return;
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