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Message-ID: <aKyT2UKmlznvN2jv@hyeyoo>
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 01:48:25 +0900
From: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@...cle.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
        "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Florent Revest <revest@...gle.com>,
        GONG Ruiqi <gongruiqi@...weicloud.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
        Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>,
        Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>, Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
        Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] slab: support for compiler-assisted type-based slab
 cache partitioning

On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 05:44:40PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> [ Beware, this an early RFC for an in-development Clang feature, and
>   requires the following Clang/LLVM development tree:
>    https://github.com/melver/llvm-project/tree/alloc-token
>   The corresponding LLVM RFC and discussion can be found here:
>    https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-a-framework-for-allocator-partitioning-hints/87434  ]

Whoa, a cutting-edge feature!

> Rework the general infrastructure around RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES into more
> flexible PARTITION_KMALLOC_CACHES, with the former being a partitioning
> mode of the latter.
> 
> Introduce a new mode, TYPED_KMALLOC_CACHES, which leverages Clang's
> "allocation tokens" via __builtin_alloc_token_infer [1].
> 
> This mechanism allows the compiler to pass a token ID derived from the
> allocation's type to the allocator. The compiler performs best-effort
> type inference, and recognizes idioms such as kmalloc(sizeof(T), ...).
> Unlike RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES, this mode deterministically assigns a slab
> cache to an allocation of type T, regardless of allocation site.

I don't think either TYPED_KMALLOC_CACHES or RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES is
strictly superior to the other (or am I wrong?). Would it be reasonable
to do some run-time randomization for TYPED_KMALLOC_CACHES too?
(i.e., randomize index within top/bottom half based on allocation site and
random seed)

> Clang's default token ID calculation is described as [1]:
> 
>    TypeHashPointerSplit: This mode assigns a token ID based on the hash
>    of the allocated type's name, where the top half ID-space is reserved
>    for types that contain pointers and the bottom half for types that do
>    not contain pointers.
> 
> Separating pointer-containing objects from pointerless objects and data
> allocations can help mitigate certain classes of memory corruption
> exploits [2]: attackers who gains a buffer overflow on a primitive
> buffer cannot use it to directly corrupt pointers or other critical
> metadata in an object residing in a different, isolated heap region.
>
> It is important to note that heap isolation strategies offer a
> best-effort approach, and do not provide a 100% security guarantee,
> albeit achievable at relatively low performance cost. Note that this
> also does not prevent cross-cache attacks, and SLAB_VIRTUAL [3] should
> be used as a complementary mitigation.

Not relevant to this patch, but just wondering if there are
any plans for SLAB_VIRTUAL?

> With all that, my kernel (x86 defconfig) shows me a histogram of slab
> cache object distribution per /proc/slabinfo (after boot):
> 
>   <slab cache>      <objs> <hist>
>   kmalloc-part-15     619  ++++++
>   kmalloc-part-14    1412  ++++++++++++++
>   kmalloc-part-13    1063  ++++++++++
>   kmalloc-part-12    1745  +++++++++++++++++
>   kmalloc-part-11     891  ++++++++
>   kmalloc-part-10     610  ++++++
>   kmalloc-part-09     792  +++++++
>   kmalloc-part-08    3054  ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   kmalloc-part-07     245  ++
>   kmalloc-part-06     182  +
>   kmalloc-part-05     122  +
>   kmalloc-part-04     295  ++
>   kmalloc-part-03     241  ++
>   kmalloc-part-02     107  +
>   kmalloc-part-01     124  +
>   kmalloc            6231  ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 
> The above /proc/slabinfo snapshot shows me there are 7547 allocated
> objects (slabs 00 - 07) that the compiler claims contain no pointers or
> it was unable to infer the type of, and 10186 objects that contain
> pointers (slabs 08 - 15). On a whole, this looks relatively sane.
> 
> Additionally, when I compile my kernel with -Rpass=alloc-token, which
> provides diagnostics where (after dead-code elimination) type inference
> failed, I see 966 allocation sites where the compiler failed to identify
> a type. Some initial review confirms these are mostly variable sized
> buffers, but also include structs with trailing flexible length arrays
> (the latter could be recognized by the compiler by teaching it to look
> more deeply into complex expressions such as those generated by
> struct_size).

When the compiler fails to identify a type, does it go to top half or
bottom half, or perhaps it doesn't matter?

> Link: https://github.com/melver/llvm-project/blob/alloc-token/clang/docs/AllocToken.rst [1]
> Link: https://blog.dfsec.com/ios/2025/05/30/blasting-past-ios-18 [2]
> Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/944647/ [3]
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> ---

I didn't go too deep into the implementation details, but I'm happy with
it since the change looks quite simple ;)

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