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Message-ID: <c8cafeaf-f36c-4eed-9ed1-7e2c2068e162@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2025 14:11:41 +0800
From: MingMing Wang <mii.w@...ux.alibaba.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc: ncardwell@...gle.com, kuniyu@...gle.com, davem@...emloft.net,
 dsahern@...nel.org, kuba@...nel.org, pabeni@...hat.com, horms@...nel.org,
 ycheng@...gle.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Dust Li <dust.li@...ux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC net] tcp: Fix orphaned socket stalling indefinitely in
 FIN-WAIT-1



On 2025/8/22 16:53, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 21, 2025 at 11:04 PM MingMing Wang <mii.w@...ux.alibaba.com> wrote:
>>
>> From: MingMing Wang <mii.w@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>
>> An orphaned TCP socket can stall indefinitely in FIN-WAIT-1
>> if the following conditions are met:
>> 1. net.ipv4.tcp_retries2 is set to a value ≤ 8;
>> 2. The peer advertises a zero window, and the window never reopens.
>>
>> Steps to reproduce:
>> 1. Set up two instances with nmap installed: one will act as the server
>>     the other as the client
>> 2. Execute on the server:
>>     a. lower rmem : `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_rmem="16 32 32"`
>>     b. start a listener: `nc -l -p 1234`
>> 3. Execute on the client:
>>     a. lower tcp_retries2: `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_retries2=8`
>>     b. send pakcets: `cat /dev/zero | nc <server-ip> 1234`
>>     c. after five seconds, stop the process: `killall nc`
>> 4. Execute on the server: `killall -STOP nc`
>> 5. Expected abnormal result: using `ss` command, we'll notice that the
>>     client connection remains stuck in the FIN_WAIT1 state, and the
>>     backoff counter always be 8 and no longer increased, as shown below:
>>     ```

Thanks for your suggestions, Eric. We will prepare the packetdrill test
and resend a series of two patches.

> 
> Hi MingMing
> 
> Please prepare and share with us a packetdrill test, instead of this
> 'repro', which is the old way of describing things :/
> 
> - This will be easier for us to understand the issue.
> 
> - It will be added to existing tests in tools/testing/selftests/net/packetdrill
> if your patch is accepted, so that we can make sure future changes are
> not breaking this again.
> 
> Ideally, you should attach this packetdrill test in a second patch
> (thus sending a series of two patches)
> 
> Thank you.
> 
>>     FIN-WAIT-1 0      1389    172.16.0.2:50316    172.16.0.1:1234
>>           cubic wscale:2,7 rto:201 backoff:8 rtt:0.078/0.007 mss:36
>>                   ... other fields omitted ...
>>     ```
>> 6. If we set tcp_retries2 to 15 and repeat the steps above, the FIN_WAIT1
>>     state will be forcefully reclaimed after about 5 minutes.
>>
>> During the zero-window probe retry process, it will check whether the
>> current connection is alive or not. If the connection is not alive and
>> the counter of retries exceeds the maximum allowed `max_probes`, retry
>> process will be terminated.
>>
>> In our case, when we set `net.ipv4.tcp_retries2` to 8 or a less value,
>> according to the current implementation, the `icsk->icsk_backoff` counter
>> will be capped at `net.ipv4.tcp_retries2`. The value calculated by
>> `inet_csk_rto_backoff` will always be too small, which means the
>> computed backoff duration will always be less than rto_max. As a result,
>> the alive check will always return true. The condition before the
>> `goto abort` statement is an logical AND condition, the abort branch
>> can never be reached.
>>
>> So, the TCP retransmission backoff mechanism has two issues:
>>
>> 1. `icsk->icsk_backoff` should monotonically increase during probe
>>     transmission and, upon reaching the maximum backoff limit, the
>>     connection should be terminated. However, the backoff value itself
>>     must not be capped prematurely — it should only control when to abort.
>>
>> 2. The condition for orphaned connection abort was incorrectly based on
>>     connection liveness and probe count. It should instead consider whether
>>     the number of orphaned probes exceeds the intended limit.
>>
>> To fix this, introduce a local variable `orphan_probes` to track orphan
>> probe attempts separately from `max_probes`, which is used for RTO
>> retransmissions. This decouples the two counters and prevents accidental
>> overwrites, ensuring correct timeout behavior for orphaned connections.
>>
>> Fixes: b248230c34970 ("tcp: abort orphan sockets stalling on zero window probes")
>> Co-developed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@...ux.alibaba.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@...ux.alibaba.com>
>> Co-developed-by: MingMing Wang <mii.w@...ux.alibaba.com>
>> Signed-off-by: MingMing Wang <mii.w@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>
>> ---
>> We couldn't determine the rationale behind the following check in tcp_send_probe0():
>> ```
>> if (icsk->icsk_backoff < READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2))
>>      icsk->icsk_backoff++;
>> ```
>>
>> This condition appears to be the root cause of the observed stall.
>> However, it has existed in the kernel for over 20 years — which suggests
>> there might be a historical or subtle reason for its presence.
>>
>> We would greatly appreciate it if anyone could shed
>> ---
>>   net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +---
>>   net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c  | 4 ++--
>>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
>> index caf11920a878..21795d696e38 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
>> @@ -4385,7 +4385,6 @@ void tcp_send_probe0(struct sock *sk)
>>   {
>>          struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
>>          struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
>> -       struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
>>          unsigned long timeout;
>>          int err;
>>
>> @@ -4401,8 +4400,7 @@ void tcp_send_probe0(struct sock *sk)
>>
>>          icsk->icsk_probes_out++;
>>          if (err <= 0) {
>> -               if (icsk->icsk_backoff < READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2))
>> -                       icsk->icsk_backoff++;
>> +               icsk->icsk_backoff++;

We agree with your perspective. Futhermore, as mentioned in the raw
text, we would appreciate it if you could clarify whether this cap is
just to prevent overflow by using a huge value, or if it should be set
to a specific meaningful value.

> 
> I think we need to have a cap, otherwise we risk overflows in
> inet_csk_rto_backoff()
> 
> 
>>                  timeout = tcp_probe0_when(sk, tcp_rto_max(sk));
>>          } else {
>>                  /* If packet was not sent due to local congestion,
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
>> index a207877270fb..4dba2928e1bf 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
>> @@ -419,9 +419,9 @@ static void tcp_probe_timer(struct sock *sk)
>>          if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
>>                  unsigned int rto_max = tcp_rto_max(sk);
>>                  const bool alive = inet_csk_rto_backoff(icsk, rto_max) < rto_max;
>> +               int orphan_probes = tcp_orphan_retries(sk, alive);
>>
>> -               max_probes = tcp_orphan_retries(sk, alive);
>> -               if (!alive && icsk->icsk_backoff >= max_probes)
>> +               if (!alive || icsk->icsk_backoff >= orphan_probes)
>>                          goto abort;
>>                  if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, true))
>>                          return;
>> --
>> 2.46.0
>>


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