[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <86frdcewue.wl-maz@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 14:08:09 +0100
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>,
Gavin Shan <gshan@...hat.com>,
Shivank Garg <shivankg@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>,
Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>,
Tao Chan <chentao@...inos.cn>,
James Houghton <jthoughton@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 00/24] KVM: Enable mmap() for guest_memfd
On Wed, 27 Aug 2025 09:43:54 +0100,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/30/25 00:54, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Paolo,
> >
> > The arm64 patches have been Reviewed-by Marc, and AFAICT the x86 side of
> > things is a go. Barring a screwup on my end, this just needs your approval.
> >
> > Assuming everything looks good, it'd be helpful to get this into kvm/next
> > shortly after rc1. The x86 Kconfig changes in particular create semantic
> > conflicts with in-flight series.
> >
> >
> > Add support for host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed memory for VM
> > types that do NOT use support KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE (which isn't
> > precisely the same thing as CoCo VMs, since x86's SEV-MEM and SEV-ES have
> > no way to detect private vs. shared).
> >
> > mmap() support paves the way for several evolving KVM use cases:
> >
> > * Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by
> > guest_memfd [1]. This provides a unified memory management model for
> > both confidential and non-confidential guests, simplifying VMM design.
> >
> > * Enhanced Security via direct map removal: When combined with Patrick's
> > series for direct map removal [2], this provides additional hardening
> > against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by eliminating the
> > need for host kernel direct maps of guest memory.
> >
> > * Lays the groundwork for *restricted* mmap() support for guest_memfd-backed
> > memory on CoCo platforms [3] that permit in-place
> > sharing of guest memory with the host.
> >
> > Based on kvm/queue.
>
> Applied to kvm/next, thanks!
Can you please create a stable branch for these patches? It is quite
likely that whatever I queue for 6.18 will conflict with that, and I'd
like to be able to resolve the conflicts myself.
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists