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Message-ID: <3eedb2f8-4356-45e9-87d6-579ca30aaa35@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2025 15:05:01 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com,
john.allen@....com, mingo@...hat.com, minipli@...ecurity.net,
mlevitsk@...hat.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
seanjc@...gle.com, tglx@...utronix.de, weijiang.yang@...el.com,
x86@...nel.org, xin@...or.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 04/21] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss
On 8/21/2025 9:30 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
>
> Set original kvm_caps.supported_xss to (host_xss & KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS) if
> XSAVES is supported. host_xss contains the host supported xstate feature
> bits for thread FPU context switch, KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS includes all KVM
> enabled XSS feature bits, the resulting value represents the supervisor
> xstates that are available to guest and are backed by host FPU framework
> for swapping {guest,host} XSAVE-managed registers/MSRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
> Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 ++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 75b7a29721bb..6b01c6e9330e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static struct kvm_user_return_msrs __percpu *user_return_msrs;
> | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \
> | XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
>
> +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS 0
> +
> bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
>
> @@ -9793,14 +9795,17 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
> kvm_host.xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
> kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 = kvm_host.xcr0 & KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0;
> }
> +
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) {
> + rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_host.xss);
> + kvm_caps.supported_xss = kvm_host.xss & KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS;
> + }
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
Btw, since we now have KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS to cap the supported bits, it
seems we can remove the
kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
in both vmx_set_cpu_caps() and svm_set_cpu_caps().
> kvm_caps.supported_quirks = KVM_X86_VALID_QUIRKS;
> kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks = KVM_X86_CONDITIONAL_QUIRKS;
>
> rdmsrq_safe(MSR_EFER, &kvm_host.efer);
>
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> - rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_host.xss);
> -
> kvm_init_pmu_capability(ops->pmu_ops);
>
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
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