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Message-ID: <20250903162200.GIaLhrKOJeL6ThYHa1@fat_crate.local>
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2025 18:22:00 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@...gle.com>,
	Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@...gle.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 00/22] x86: strict separation of startup code

On Thu, Aug 28, 2025 at 12:22:03PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Changes since v6:
> - Rebase onto latest tip/master which incorporates v6.17-rc1a

...

So, due to the interactions with the Secure AVIC stuff, I've been doing some
patch tetris. Two patches: the first one goes ontop of x86/apic and the second
one goes ontop of this set.

Will run some build tests with them first tho...

patch 1:

---

commit aa532319e46228422f7deb8d54853c4b218276f1 (HEAD -> refs/heads/tip-x86-apic)
Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Date:   Wed Sep 3 17:42:05 2025 +0200

    WIP
    
    Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index b64f43010a12..e858e2979db0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ u64 savic_ghcb_msr_read(u32 reg)
 	if (res != ES_OK) {
 		pr_err("Secure AVIC MSR (0x%llx) read returned error (%d)\n", msr, res);
 		/* MSR read failures are treated as fatal errors */
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);
 	}
 
 	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ void savic_ghcb_msr_write(u32 reg, u64 value)
 	if (res != ES_OK) {
 		pr_err("Secure AVIC MSR (0x%llx) write returned error (%d)\n", msr, res);
 		/* MSR writes should never fail. Any failure is fatal error for SNP guest */
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);
 	}
 
 	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index 0020d77a0800..01a6e4dbe423 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
 #define GHCB_TERM_SVSM_CAA		9	/* SVSM is present but CAA is not page aligned */
 #define GHCB_TERM_SECURE_TSC		10	/* Secure TSC initialization failed */
 #define GHCB_TERM_SVSM_CA_REMAP_FAIL	11	/* SVSM is present but CA could not be remapped */
+#define GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL		12	/* Secure AVIC-specific failure */
 
 #define GHCB_RESP_CODE(v)		((v) & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
index b846de0fbcfa..2b82bb64055a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static void savic_setup(void)
 	 */
 	res = savic_register_gpa(gpa);
 	if (res != ES_OK)
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);
 
 	native_wrmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL,
 		      gpa | MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_EN | MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_ALLOWEDNMI);
@@ -376,13 +376,13 @@ static int savic_probe(void)
 
 	if (!x2apic_mode) {
 		pr_err("Secure AVIC enabled in non x2APIC mode\n");
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);
 		/* unreachable */
 	}
 
 	savic_page = alloc_percpu(struct secure_avic_page);
 	if (!savic_page)
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);;
 
 	return 1;
 }

---

patch 2

---

commit 07d41a19c5a01506e1080e352c26c50c8dce6e6b (refs/remotes/ps2/tip-x86-sev, refs/remotes/ps2/HEAD)
Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Date:   Wed Sep 3 18:14:54 2025 +0200

    WIP
    
    Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
index 39465a0ff4e5..a9b0a9c32d8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static struct cc_blob_sev_info *__init find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
 
 found_cc_info:
 	if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
 
 	return cc_info;
 }
@@ -218,8 +218,3 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 
 	return true;
 }
-
-void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void)
-{
-	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
-}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
index 2ddde901c8c5..e7ea65f3f1d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	 * enablement abort the guest.
 	 */
 	if (snp_en ^ !!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
-		snp_abort();
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
 
 	/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
 	if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index f222bef9dca8..32c7dd916e4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -512,7 +512,6 @@ void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages);
 void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages);
 void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
 bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
-void __noreturn snp_abort(void);
 void snp_dmi_setup(void);
 int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input);
 void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end);
@@ -597,7 +596,6 @@ static inline void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npag
 static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages) { }
 static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { }
 static inline bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) { return false; }
-static inline void snp_abort(void) { }
 static inline void snp_dmi_setup(void) { }
 static inline int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input)
 {
diff --git a/tools/objtool/noreturns.h b/tools/objtool/noreturns.h
index 6a922d046b8e..802895fae3ca 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/noreturns.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/noreturns.h
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ NORETURN(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 NORETURN(rust_begin_unwind)
 NORETURN(rust_helper_BUG)
 NORETURN(sev_es_terminate)
-NORETURN(snp_abort)
 NORETURN(start_kernel)
 NORETURN(stop_this_cpu)
 NORETURN(usercopy_abort)


-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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