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Message-ID: <175698485592.1920.6333896615534687362.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 04 Sep 2025 11:20:55 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Move __sev_[get|put]_ghcb() into separate
noinstr object
The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:
Commit-ID: d4077e6ad35121b97f3233da5d60763de3d23df9
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/d4077e6ad35121b97f3233da5d60763de3d23df9
Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
AuthorDate: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 12:22:16 +02:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 03 Sep 2025 17:59:46 +02:00
x86/sev: Move __sev_[get|put]_ghcb() into separate noinstr object
Rename sev-nmi.c to noinstr.c, and move the get/put GHCB routines into it too,
which are also annotated as 'noinstr' and suffer from the same problem as the
NMI code, i.e., that GCC may ignore the __no_sanitize_address__ function
attribute implied by 'noinstr' and insert KASAN instrumentation anyway.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-37-ardb+git@google.com
---
arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c | 74 +-----------
arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile | 8 +-
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c | 108 +----------------
4 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
delete mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
index 138b26f..9f4b4ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
@@ -41,83 +41,9 @@
#include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
-/*
- * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
- * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
- *
- * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
- */
-noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
- /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
-
- if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
- /*
- * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
- * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
- * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
- * can be printed out.
- */
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
- instrumentation_begin();
- panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
- instrumentation_end();
- }
-
- /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
- data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
-
- state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
-
- /* Backup GHCB content */
- *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
- } else {
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- data->ghcb_active = true;
- }
-
- return ghcb;
-}
-
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-shared.c"
-noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (state->ghcb) {
- /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
- *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- } else {
- /*
- * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
- * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
- */
- vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- }
-}
-
void __head
early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned long npages, const struct psc_desc *desc)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
index 342d79f..3b8ae21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-obj-y += core.o sev-nmi.o vc-handle.o
+obj-y += core.o noinstr.o vc-handle.o
# Clang 14 and older may fail to respect __no_sanitize_undefined when inlining
-UBSAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE_noinstr.o := n
# GCC may fail to respect __no_sanitize_address or __no_kcsan when inlining
-KASAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
-KCSAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_noinstr.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_noinstr.o := n
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b527eaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE
+ *
+ * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/sev-internal.h>
+
+static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
+
+ /* User-mode RSP is not trusted */
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ return false;
+
+ /* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */
+ if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs))
+ return false;
+
+ return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC
+ * exception handler entry code, before the #VC handler has switched off
+ * its IST stack. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted,
+ * so that any nested #VC exception will not overwrite the stack
+ * contents of the interrupted #VC handler.
+ *
+ * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be
+ * unconditionally adjusted back in __sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a
+ * nested sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too
+ * early.
+ *
+ * The __sev_es_ist_enter() and __sev_es_ist_exit() functions always run
+ * on the NMI IST stack, as they are only called from NMI handling code
+ * right now.
+ */
+void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;
+
+ /* Read old IST entry */
+ new_ist = old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
+
+ /*
+ * If NMI happened while on the #VC IST stack, set the new IST
+ * value below regs->sp, so that the interrupted stack frame is
+ * not overwritten by subsequent #VC exceptions.
+ */
+ if (on_vc_stack(regs))
+ new_ist = regs->sp;
+
+ /*
+ * Reserve additional 8 bytes and store old IST value so this
+ * adjustment can be unrolled in __sev_es_ist_exit().
+ */
+ new_ist -= sizeof(old_ist);
+ *(unsigned long *)new_ist = old_ist;
+
+ /* Set new IST entry */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
+}
+
+void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ist;
+
+ /* Read IST entry */
+ ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
+
+ if (WARN_ON(ist == __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *(unsigned long *)ist);
+}
+
+void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa_nodebug(ghcb));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
+ * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
+ *
+ * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
+ */
+noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
+ /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
+
+ if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
+ /*
+ * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
+ * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
+ * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
+ * can be printed out.
+ */
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+ instrumentation_end();
+ }
+
+ /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
+
+ state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+
+ /* Backup GHCB content */
+ *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
+ } else {
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ data->ghcb_active = true;
+ }
+
+ return ghcb;
+}
+
+noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (state->ghcb) {
+ /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
+ *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
+ * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
+ */
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d8dfadd..0000000
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-/*
- * AMD Memory Encryption Support
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE
- *
- * Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
- */
-
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV: " fmt
-
-#include <linux/bug.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-
-#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
-#include <asm/msr.h>
-#include <asm/ptrace.h>
-#include <asm/sev.h>
-#include <asm/sev-internal.h>
-
-static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
-
- /* User-mode RSP is not trusted */
- if (user_mode(regs))
- return false;
-
- /* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */
- if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs))
- return false;
-
- return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)));
-}
-
-/*
- * This function handles the case when an NMI is raised in the #VC
- * exception handler entry code, before the #VC handler has switched off
- * its IST stack. In this case, the IST entry for #VC must be adjusted,
- * so that any nested #VC exception will not overwrite the stack
- * contents of the interrupted #VC handler.
- *
- * The IST entry is adjusted unconditionally so that it can be also be
- * unconditionally adjusted back in __sev_es_ist_exit(). Otherwise a
- * nested sev_es_ist_exit() call may adjust back the IST entry too
- * early.
- *
- * The __sev_es_ist_enter() and __sev_es_ist_exit() functions always run
- * on the NMI IST stack, as they are only called from NMI handling code
- * right now.
- */
-void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- unsigned long old_ist, new_ist;
-
- /* Read old IST entry */
- new_ist = old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
-
- /*
- * If NMI happened while on the #VC IST stack, set the new IST
- * value below regs->sp, so that the interrupted stack frame is
- * not overwritten by subsequent #VC exceptions.
- */
- if (on_vc_stack(regs))
- new_ist = regs->sp;
-
- /*
- * Reserve additional 8 bytes and store old IST value so this
- * adjustment can be unrolled in __sev_es_ist_exit().
- */
- new_ist -= sizeof(old_ist);
- *(unsigned long *)new_ist = old_ist;
-
- /* Set new IST entry */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
-}
-
-void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void)
-{
- unsigned long ist;
-
- /* Read IST entry */
- ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
-
- if (WARN_ON(ist == __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC)))
- return;
-
- /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *(unsigned long *)ist);
-}
-
-void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
-{
- struct ghcb_state state;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
-
- vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
-
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa_nodebug(ghcb));
- VMGEXIT();
-
- __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
-}
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