linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Reject non-positive effective lengths during LAUNCH

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Message-ID: <b55f2ab4-da7c-5fed-adab-ceca54282ddb@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2025 16:35:58 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Reject non-positive effective lengths during
 LAUNCH_UPDATE

On 8/26/25 18:37, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Check for an invalid length during LAUNCH_UPDATE at the start of
> snp_launch_update() instead of subtly relying on kvm_gmem_populate() to
> detect the bad state.  Code that directly handles userspace input
> absolutely should sanitize those inputs; failure to do so is asking for
> bugs where KVM consumes an invalid "npages".
> 
> Keep the check in gmem, but wrap it in a WARN to flag any bad usage by
> the caller.
> 
> Note, this is technically an ABI change as KVM would previously allow a
> length of '0'.  But allowing a length of '0' is nonsensical and creates
> pointless conundrums in KVM.  E.g. an empty range is arguably neither
> private nor shared, but LAUNCH_UPDATE will fail if the starting gpa can't
> be made private.  In practice, no known or well-behaved VMM passes a
> length of '0'.
> 
> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
> 
> Compile tested only.  Came across this when trying to figure out how to
> handle the batching of gmem post-populate calls.
> 
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 ++
>  virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 3 ++-
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index f4381878a9e5..746a57bf1f71 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2360,6 +2360,8 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE;
> +	if (npages <= 0)
> +		return -EINVAL;

Would it make sense to include a !params.len in the giant if check just
above this, e.g.:

	if (!params.len || !PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) || ...

?

That way everything related to checking "params" remains in the one
statement.

Thanks,
Tom

>  
>  	/*
>  	 * For each GFN that's being prepared as part of the initial guest
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index 7d85cc33c0bb..79552467add5 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> @@ -639,7 +639,8 @@ long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long
>  	long i;
>  
>  	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
> -	if (npages < 0)
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages <= 0))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn);
> 
> base-commit: ecbcc2461839e848970468b44db32282e5059925