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Message-ID: <20250910053147.1152253-8-wangjinchao600@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 13:31:14 +0800
From: Jinchao Wang <wangjinchao600@...il.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
	"Naveen N . Rao" <naveen@...nel.org>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
	kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>,
	Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
	"Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	x86@...nel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Jinchao Wang <wangjinchao600@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 16/19] mm/ksw: add silent corruption test case

Introduce a new test scenario to simulate silent stack corruption:

- silent_corruption_buggy():
  exposes a local variable address globally without resetting it.
- silent_corruption_unwitting():
  reads the exposed pointer and modifies the memory, simulating a routine
  that unknowingly writes to another stack frame.
- silent_corruption_victim():
  demonstrates the effect of silent corruption on unrelated local variables.

Signed-off-by: Jinchao Wang <wangjinchao600@...il.com>
---
 mm/kstackwatch/test.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/kstackwatch/test.c b/mm/kstackwatch/test.c
index ab1a3f92b5e8..b10465381089 100644
--- a/mm/kstackwatch/test.c
+++ b/mm/kstackwatch/test.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ static struct proc_dir_entry *test_proc;
 #define BUFFER_SIZE 4
 #define MAX_DEPTH 6
 
+/* global variables for Silent corruption test */
+static u64 *g_corrupt_ptr;
+
 /*
  * Test Case 0: Write to the canary position directly (Canary Test)
  * use a u64 buffer array to ensure the canary will be placed
@@ -61,6 +64,89 @@ static void canary_test_overflow(void)
 	pr_info("canary overflow test completed\n");
 }
 
+static void do_something(int min_ms, int max_ms)
+{
+	u32 rand;
+
+	get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+	rand = min_ms + rand % (max_ms - min_ms + 1);
+	msleep(rand);
+}
+
+static void silent_corruption_buggy(int i)
+{
+	u64 local_var;
+
+	pr_info("starting %s\n", __func__);
+
+	pr_info("%s %d local_var addr: 0x%lx\n", __func__, i,
+		(unsigned long)&local_var);
+	WRITE_ONCE(g_corrupt_ptr, &local_var);
+	do_something(0, 300);
+	//buggy: return without resetting g_corrupt_ptr
+}
+
+static int silent_corruption_unwitting(void *data)
+{
+	u64 *local_ptr;
+
+	pr_debug("starting %s\n", __func__);
+
+	do {
+		local_ptr = READ_ONCE(g_corrupt_ptr);
+		do_something(0, 300);
+	} while (!local_ptr);
+
+	local_ptr[0] = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void silent_corruption_victim(int i)
+{
+	u64 local_var;
+
+	pr_debug("starting %s %dth\n", __func__, i);
+
+	/* local_var random in [0xff0000, 0x100ffff] */
+	get_random_bytes(&local_var, sizeof(local_var));
+	local_var = 0xff0000 + local_var & 0xffff;
+
+	pr_debug("%s local_var addr: 0x%lx\n", __func__,
+		 (unsigned long)&local_var);
+
+	do_something(0, 100);
+
+	if (local_var >= 0xff0000 && local_var <= 0xffffff)
+		pr_info("%s %d happy with 0x%llx\n", __func__, i, local_var);
+	else
+		pr_info("%s %d unhappy with 0x%llx\n", __func__, i, local_var);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test Case 2: Silent Corruption
+ * buggy() does not protect its local var correctly
+ * unwitting() simply does its intended work
+ * victim() is unaware know what happened
+ */
+static void silent_corruption_test(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *unwitting;
+
+	pr_info("starting %s\n", __func__);
+	WRITE_ONCE(g_corrupt_ptr, NULL);
+
+	unwitting = kthread_run(silent_corruption_unwitting, NULL, "unwitting");
+	if (IS_ERR(unwitting)) {
+		pr_err("failed to create thread2\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	silent_corruption_buggy(0);
+	for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+		silent_corruption_victim(i);
+}
+
 static ssize_t test_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 			       size_t count, loff_t *pos)
 {
@@ -88,6 +174,10 @@ static ssize_t test_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 			pr_info("triggering canary overflow test\n");
 			canary_test_overflow();
 			break;
+		case 2:
+			pr_info("triggering silent corruption test\n");
+			silent_corruption_test();
+			break;
 		default:
 			pr_err("Unknown test number %d\n", test_num);
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -108,7 +198,8 @@ static ssize_t test_proc_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
 		"==================================\n"
 		"Usage:\n"
 		"  echo 'test0' > /proc/kstackwatch_test  - Canary write test\n"
-		"  echo 'test1' > /proc/kstackwatch_test  - Canary overflow test\n";
+		"  echo 'test1' > /proc/kstackwatch_test  - Canary overflow test\n"
+		"  echo 'test2' > /proc/kstackwatch_test  - Silent corruption test\n";
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, count, pos, usage,
 				       strlen(usage));
-- 
2.43.0


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