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Message-ID: <CAFRLqsUfDuoMMCUmBuSkiV_b=VNn7CuYqJSc19bhyQ6Kims36w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 20:33:53 +0800
From: cen zhang <zzzccc427@...il.com>
To: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@...il.com>, johan.hedberg@...il.com, marcel@...tmann.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, baijiaju1990@...il.com,
zhenghaoran154@...il.com, r33s3n6@...il.com, linux-bluetooth@...r.kernel.org,
"gality369@...il.com" <gality369@...il.com>
Subject: [BUG]: slab-use-after-free Read in mgmt_set_powered_complete
Hello maintainers,
I would like to report a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability
found in the Bluetooth management subsystem using our
customized syzkaller on 6.17.0-rc5.
The bug occurs due to a race condition between HCI command completion
callbacks and HCI socket bind operations that trigger device cleanup.
After my superficial analysis, the situation when race occurs may be as follows:
PATH 1 - SET_POWERED Command Execution:
1. User space application sends MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED command via HCI
management socket
2. set_powered() function creates mgmt_pending_cmd object via mgmt_pending_add()
3. Command is submitted to HCI work queue via
hci_cmd_sync_submit()/hci_cmd_sync_queue()
4. Work queue executes set_powered_sync() followed by
mgmt_set_powered_complete() callback
5. mgmt_set_powered_complete() attempts to access cmd->param (line 1342)
PATH 2 - HCI Socket Bind Cleanup:
1. Another process attempts to bind HCI socket with HCI_CHANNEL_USER mode
2. hci_sock_bind() calls mgmt_index_removed() to clean up management state
3. mgmt_index_removed() calls mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, true, ...)
4. All pending commands are removed and freed, including the
SET_POWERED command object
5. The mgmt_pending_cmd object and its cmd->param are freed via
mgmt_pending_free()
RACE CONDITION:
The issue occurs when PATH 2 executes between the time PATH 1 submits
the command
to the work queue and when the completion callback accesses
cmd->param. The current
protection mechanism in mgmt_set_powered_complete() has a TOCTOU
(Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use) flaw:
if (err == -ECANCELED || cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev))
return;
cp = cmd->param; // <-- USE-AFTER-FREE occurs here
The check allowing the cmd object to be freed between
the validation and the actual memory access.
The detail KASAN report as follow:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
mgmt_set_powered_complete+0x83d/0xf10 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1342
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810edd90b0 by task kworker/u17:3/811
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 811 Comm: kworker/u17:3 Not tainted
6.17.0-rc5-ge5bbb70171d1 #7 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xca/0x130 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x171/0x7f0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:595
mgmt_set_powered_complete+0x83d/0xf10 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1342
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x8df/0xaf0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x7a8/0x1030 kernel/workqueue.c:3319
worker_thread+0xb97/0x11d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
kthread+0x3d4/0x800 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x13b/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Allocated by task 197:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:405
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0xcd/0x580 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
mgmt_pending_add+0x54/0x410 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
set_powered+0x8c6/0xea0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1407
hci_mgmt_cmd+0x1ee4/0x33f0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
hci_sock_sendmsg+0xcb0/0x2510 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:729
sock_write_iter+0x1b7/0x250 net/socket.c:1179
do_iter_readv_writev+0x598/0x760
vfs_writev+0x3c8/0xd20 fs/read_write.c:1057
do_writev+0x105/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1103
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 100890:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:243 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x41/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:275
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2428 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4701 [inline]
kfree+0x189/0x390 mm/slub.c:4900
mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline]
mgmt_pending_foreach+0x6c4/0x8a0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257
mgmt_index_removed+0x164/0x530 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9370
hci_sock_bind+0x151a/0x1f30 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314
__sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1858 [inline]
__sys_bind+0x229/0x2f0 net/socket.c:1889
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1894 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1892 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810edd9080
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of
freed 96-byte region [ffff88810edd9080, ffff88810edd90e0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10edd9
anon flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0200000000000000 ffff888100042280 ffffea00041e07c0 dead000000000003
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810edd8f80: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88810edd9000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
>ffff88810edd9080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810edd9100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88810edd9180: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Best regards,
Cen Zhang
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