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Message-ID: <e5d594d0aee93da67a22a42d0e2b4e6e463ab894.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2025 19:01:08 +0200
From: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@...il.com>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
regressions@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: [bug report] [regression?] bpf lsm breaks /proc/*/attr/current with
security= on commandline
Hello,
TLDR: because of bpf lsm, putting security=selinux on commandline
results in /proc/*/attr/current returning errors.
When the legacy security= commandline option is used, the specified lsm
is added to the end of the lsm list. For example, security=apparmor
results in the following order of security modules:
capability,landlock,lockdown,yama,bpf,apparmor
In particular, the bpf lsm will be ordered before the chosen major lsm.
This causes reads and writes of /proc/*/attr/current to fail, because
the bpf hook overrides the apparmor/selinux hook.
As you can see in the code below, only the first registered hook is
called (when reading attr/current, lsmid is 0):
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name,
char **value)
{
struct lsm_static_call *scall;
lsm_for_each_hook(scall, getprocattr) {
if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != scall->hl->lsmid->id)
continue;
return scall->hl->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
}
Even though the bpf lsm doesn't allow attaching bpf programs to this
hook, it still prevents the other hooks from being called.
This is maybe a regression, because with the same commandline, reading
from /proc/*/attr/current probably worked before the introduction of
bpf lsm.
Regards,
Filip Hejsek
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