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Message-ID: <2d15f9a0368a660c0468299f430e22c1329a67e8.1757952252.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 11:04:12 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
<stable@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Guard sev_evict_cache() with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
The sev_evict_cache() is guest-related code and should be guarded by
CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, not CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV.
CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is required for a guest to run properly as an
SEV-SNP guest, but a guest kernel built with CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n would
get the stub function of sev_evict_cache() instead of the version that
performs the actual eviction. Move the function declarations under the
appropriate #ifdef.
Fixes: 7b306dfa326f ("x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation")
Cc: <stable@...nel.org> # 6.16.x
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 02236962fdb1..465b19fd1a2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -562,6 +562,24 @@ enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb,
extern struct ghcb *boot_ghcb;
+static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
+{
+ volatile u8 val __always_unused;
+ u8 *bytes = va;
+ int page_idx;
+
+ /*
+ * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page
+ * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines
+ * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a
+ * full CLFLUSH sequence.
+ */
+ for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) {
+ val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE];
+ val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1];
+ }
+}
+
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#define snp_vmpl 0
@@ -605,6 +623,7 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc,
static inline int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
+static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
@@ -619,24 +638,6 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
void kdump_sev_callback(void);
void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
-
-static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
-{
- volatile u8 val __always_unused;
- u8 *bytes = va;
- int page_idx;
-
- /*
- * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page
- * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines
- * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a
- * full CLFLUSH sequence.
- */
- for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) {
- val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE];
- val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1];
- }
-}
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
@@ -652,7 +653,6 @@ static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV
static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
-static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {}
#endif
#endif
base-commit: f83ec76bf285bea5727f478a68b894f5543ca76e
--
2.46.2
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