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Message-ID: <175802727465.709179.15552114068758812343.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 12:54:34 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Use early_param() for spectre_v2_user
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 8edb9e77119be3cdd930e71204ee48c4994b217b
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8edb9e77119be3cdd930e71204ee48c4994b217b
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 08:47:00 -05:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 17:07:22 +02:00
x86/bugs: Use early_param() for spectre_v2_user
Most of the mitigations in bugs.c use early_param() to parse their command
line options. Modify spectre_v2_user to use early_param() for consistency.
Remove spec_v2_user_print_cond() because informing a user about their
cmdline choice isn't very interesting and the chosen mitigation is already
printed in spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation().
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250819192200.2003074-2-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e817bba..a5072ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
-enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
+enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
@@ -1857,6 +1857,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
};
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_user_cmd __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
+
static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable",
[SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
@@ -1865,50 +1868,31 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
};
-static const struct {
- const char *option;
- enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
- bool secure;
-} v2_user_options[] __initconst = {
- { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false },
- { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false },
- { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true },
- { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false },
- { "prctl,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, false },
- { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false },
- { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false },
-};
-
-static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
-{
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
- pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
-}
-
-static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
+static int __init spectre_v2_user_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
- char arg[20];
- int ret, i;
-
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2))
- return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
-
- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
- arg, sizeof(arg));
- if (ret < 0)
- return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
- if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
- spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
- v2_user_options[i].secure);
- return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
- }
- }
+ if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "prctl"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "prctl,ibpb"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "seccomp"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "seccomp,ibpb"))
+ spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB;
+ else
+ pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_v2_user option (%s).", str);
- pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to default\n", arg);
- return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+ return 0;
}
+early_param("spectre_v2_user", spectre_v2_user_parse_cmdline);
static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
@@ -1920,7 +1904,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
return;
- switch (spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_user_cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
return;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
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