linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v15 16/41] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs

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Message-ID: <aMq7RTmfPhfhDCtI@google.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2025 06:44:37 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>, 
	John Allen <john.allen@....com>, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, 
	Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>, 
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 16/41] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs

On Wed, Sep 17, 2025, Binbin Wu wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> > 
> > Enable/disable CET MSRs interception per associated feature configuration.
> > 
> > Pass through CET MSRs that are managed by XSAVE, as they cannot be
> > intercepted without also intercepting XSAVE. However, intercepting XSAVE
> > would likely cause unacceptable performance overhead.
> Here may be a bit confusing about the description of "managed by XSAVE" because
> KVM has a function is_xstate_managed_msr(), and MSR_IA32_S_CET is not xstate
> managed in it.

Ooh, yeah, definitely confusing.  And the XSAVE part is also misleading to some
extent, because strictly speaking it's XSAVES/XRSTORS.  And performance isn't
the main concern, it's the complexity of emulating XSAVES/XRSTORS that's the
non-starter.  I think it's also worth calling out that the code intentionally
doesn't check XSAVES support.

  Disable interception for CET MSRs that can be accessed ia vXSAVES/XRSTORS,
  as accesses through XSTATE aren't subject to MSR interception checks, i.e.
  cannot be intercepted without intercepting and emulating XSAVES/XRSTORS,
  and KVM doesn't support emulating XSAVE/XRSTOR instructions.

  Don't condition interception on the guest actually having XSAVES as there
  is no benefit to intercepting the accesses.  The MSRs in question are
  either context switched by the CPU on VM-Enter/VM-Exit or by KVM via
  XSAVES/XRSTORS (KVM requires XSAVES to virtualization SHSTK), i.e. KVM is
  going to load guest values into hardware irrespective of XSAVES support.

> Otherwise,
> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
> 
> > MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB is not managed by XSAVE, so it is intercepted.
> > 
> > Note, this MSR design introduced an architectural limitation of SHSTK and
> > IBT control for guest, i.e., when SHSTK is exposed, IBT is also available
> > to guest from architectural perspective since IBT relies on subset of SHSTK
> > relevant MSRs.
> > 
> > Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> > Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>
> > Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> > Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > ---
> >   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> >   1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index 4fc1dbba2eb0..adf5af30e537 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -4101,6 +4101,8 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >   void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >   {
> > +	bool intercept;
> > +
> >   	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
> >   		return;
> > @@ -4146,6 +4148,23 @@ void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >   		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
> >   					  !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
> > +	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> > +		intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> > +
> > +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> > +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> > +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> > +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> > +		intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
> > +			    !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> > +
> > +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> > +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> > +	}
> > +
> >   	/*
> >   	 * x2APIC and LBR MSR intercepts are modified on-demand and cannot be
> >   	 * filtered by userspace.
>