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Message-ID: <52cc9795-970e-4940-80d1-490daed636c4@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2025 16:32:26 +0800
From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 16/41] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs
On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
>
> Enable/disable CET MSRs interception per associated feature configuration.
>
> Pass through CET MSRs that are managed by XSAVE, as they cannot be
> intercepted without also intercepting XSAVE. However, intercepting XSAVE
> would likely cause unacceptable performance overhead.
Here may be a bit confusing about the description of "managed by XSAVE" because
KVM has a function is_xstate_managed_msr(), and MSR_IA32_S_CET is not xstate
managed in it.
Otherwise,
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
> MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB is not managed by XSAVE, so it is intercepted.
>
> Note, this MSR design introduced an architectural limitation of SHSTK and
> IBT control for guest, i.e., when SHSTK is exposed, IBT is also available
> to guest from architectural perspective since IBT relies on subset of SHSTK
> relevant MSRs.
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 4fc1dbba2eb0..adf5af30e537 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -4101,6 +4101,8 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> + bool intercept;
> +
> if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
> return;
>
> @@ -4146,6 +4148,23 @@ void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
> !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
>
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> + intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> +
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> + }
> +
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> + intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
> + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> +
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
> + }
> +
> /*
> * x2APIC and LBR MSR intercepts are modified on-demand and cannot be
> * filtered by userspace.
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