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Message-ID: <65465d1e-a7bd-4eac-a0ba-8c6cce85e3ed@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2025 16:48:47 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
 Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
 Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>, Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states
 to VMCS fields

On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
...
> +static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
> +{
> +	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
> +}

When looking at the patch 19, I realize that

   { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE }

is added into vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] there.

So ...

>   static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
>   {
>   	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index adf5af30e537..e8155635cb42 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -4320,6 +4320,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>   
>   	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
>   		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
> +	 * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
> +	 * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
> +	 * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
> +	 * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
> +	 * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
> +	 * 3 and 4 for details.
> +	 */
> +	if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {

... cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl() cannot ensure the existence of host CET 
fields, unless we change it to check vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl or add CET 
entry_exit pair into the vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] in this patch.

> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
> +	}
>   }

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