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Message-ID: <aMx351jkCPIv_j61@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 14:21:43 -0700
From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>
To: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@...gle.com>
Cc: maz@...nel.org, joey.gouly@....com, suzuki.poulose@....com,
yuzenghui@...wei.com, catalin.marinas@....com, will@...nel.org,
qperret@...gle.com, sebastianene@...gle.com, keirf@...gle.com,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Validate input range for pKVM mem transitions
On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 07:00:49PM +0100, Vincent Donnefort wrote:
> There's currently no verification for host issued ranges in most of the
> pKVM memory transitions. The subsequent end boundary might therefore be
> subject to overflow and could evade the later checks.
>
> Close this loophole with an additional range_is_valid() check on a per
> public function basis.
>
> host_unshare_guest transition is already protected via
> __check_host_shared_guest(), while assert_host_shared_guest() callers
> are already ignoring host checks.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@...gle.com>
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> index 8957734d6183..b156fb0bad0f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> @@ -443,6 +443,11 @@ static bool range_is_memory(u64 start, u64 end)
> return is_in_mem_range(end - 1, &r);
> }
>
> +static bool range_is_valid(u64 start, u64 end)
> +{
> + return start < end;
> +}
> +
I'm being unnecessarily pedantic but isn't something like [-2MiB, 0) a
legal range if we had 64 bits of PA? Looks correct though so:
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>
Thanks,
Oliver
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