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Message-ID: <CAMj1kXE+hvMQLU6UF3QvTyo9Y1eUjCnPcPnMU9bOe4FDZ-N+EQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 13:57:22 +0200
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, 
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>, 
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, 
	Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/8] arm64/fpsimd: Drop special handling for EFI
 runtime services

On Thu, 18 Sept 2025 at 12:30, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
>
> Now that the use of kernel mode FP/SIMD is generally permitted when IRQs
> are disabled, the only purpose served by the EFI-specific fallback code
> in fpsimd.c is the case where an EFI call occurs from hardirq or NMI
> context. No such cases are known to occur in practice, and it is
> doubtful whether calling into the EFI firmware for any reason under such
> conditions would be a good idea to begin with.
>
> So disallow EFI runtime services in such cases. This means all the
> fallback code can be dropped.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h |   4 -
>  arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c         |   8 +-
>  arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c      | 121 --------------------
>  3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
>

This patch is incomplete, the following needs to be folded in as well:

 arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 39 ---------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
index e543dd569bd7..c846161a002b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
@@ -180,13 +180,6 @@
        set_default_vl(ARM64_VEC_SVE, val);
 }

-static u8 *efi_sve_state;
-
-#else /* ! CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */
-
-/* Dummy declaration for code that will be optimised out: */
-extern u8 *efi_sve_state;
-
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */

 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME
@@ -1086,36 +1079,6 @@
        return 0;
 }

-static void __init sve_efi_setup(void)
-{
-       int max_vl = 0;
-       int i;
-
-       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
-               return;
-
-       for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vl_info); i++)
-               max_vl = max(vl_info[i].max_vl, max_vl);
-
-       /*
-        * alloc_percpu() warns and prints a backtrace if this goes wrong.
-        * This is evidence of a crippled system and we are returning void,
-        * so no attempt is made to handle this situation here.
-        */
-       if (!sve_vl_valid(max_vl))
-               goto fail;
-
-       efi_sve_state = kmalloc(SVE_SIG_REGS_SIZE(sve_vq_from_vl(max_vl)),
-                               GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!efi_sve_state)
-               goto fail;
-
-       return;
-
-fail:
-       panic("Cannot allocate memory for EFI SVE save/restore");
-}
-
 void cpu_enable_sve(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__always_unused p)
 {
        write_sysreg(read_sysreg(CPACR_EL1) | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN, CPACR_EL1);
@@ -1176,8 +1139,6 @@
        if (sve_max_virtualisable_vl() < sve_max_vl())
                pr_warn("%s: unvirtualisable vector lengths present\n",
                        info->name);
-
-       sve_efi_setup();
 }

 /*

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