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Message-ID: <aM0rFlaVKRkNxQPS@google.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 11:06:14 +0100
From: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@...gle.com>
To: Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>
Cc: maz@...nel.org, oliver.upton@...ux.dev, joey.gouly@....com,
suzuki.poulose@....com, yuzenghui@...wei.com,
catalin.marinas@....com, will@...nel.org, sebastianene@...gle.com,
keirf@...gle.com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Validate input range for pKVM mem transitions
On Fri, Sep 19, 2025 at 09:52:20AM +0000, Quentin Perret wrote:
> On Thursday 18 Sep 2025 at 19:00:49 (+0100), Vincent Donnefort wrote:
> > There's currently no verification for host issued ranges in most of the
> > pKVM memory transitions. The subsequent end boundary might therefore be
> > subject to overflow and could evade the later checks.
> >
> > Close this loophole with an additional range_is_valid() check on a per
> > public function basis.
> >
> > host_unshare_guest transition is already protected via
> > __check_host_shared_guest(), while assert_host_shared_guest() callers
> > are already ignoring host checks.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@...gle.com>
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> > index 8957734d6183..b156fb0bad0f 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> > @@ -443,6 +443,11 @@ static bool range_is_memory(u64 start, u64 end)
> > return is_in_mem_range(end - 1, &r);
> > }
> >
> > +static bool range_is_valid(u64 start, u64 end)
> > +{
> > + return start < end;
> > +}
> > +
> > static inline int __host_stage2_idmap(u64 start, u64 end,
> > enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot)
> > {
> > @@ -776,6 +781,9 @@ int __pkvm_host_donate_hyp(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages)
> > void *virt = __hyp_va(phys);
> > int ret;
> >
> > + if (!range_is_valid(phys, phys + size))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > host_lock_component();
> > hyp_lock_component();
> >
> > @@ -804,6 +812,9 @@ int __pkvm_hyp_donate_host(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages)
> > u64 virt = (u64)__hyp_va(phys);
> > int ret;
> >
> > + if (!range_is_valid(phys, phys + size))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > host_lock_component();
> > hyp_lock_component();
> >
> > @@ -887,6 +898,9 @@ int __pkvm_host_share_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages)
> > u64 size = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages;
>
> It occurred to me that this can also overflow, so perhaps fold that
> calculation into your helper as well to be on the safe?
I believe this is currently fine everywhere because nr_pages is solely used for
size computation. But happy to use nr_pages as a range_is_valid() argument
(instead of end) to verify size as well. That'll surely be more future-proof.
Let me respin that.
>
> Thanks,
> Quentin
>
> > int ret;
> >
> > + if (!range_is_valid(phys, phys + size))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > host_lock_component();
> > ret = __host_check_page_state_range(phys, size, PKVM_PAGE_OWNED);
> > if (!ret)
> > @@ -902,6 +916,9 @@ int __pkvm_host_unshare_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages)
> > u64 size = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages;
> > int ret;
> >
> > + if (!range_is_valid(phys, phys + size))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > host_lock_component();
> > ret = __host_check_page_state_range(phys, size, PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_OWNED);
> > if (!ret)
> > @@ -949,6 +966,9 @@ int __pkvm_host_share_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, u64 nr_pages, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> >
> > + if (!range_is_valid(phys, phys + size))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > ret = check_range_allowed_memory(phys, phys + size);
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> >
> > base-commit: 8b789f2b7602a818e7c7488c74414fae21392b63
> > --
> > 2.51.0.470.ga7dc726c21-goog
> >
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