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Message-ID: <20250923233934.GJ8084@frogsfrogsfrogs>
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 16:39:34 -0700
From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@...nel.org>
To: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@...il.com>
Cc: tytso@....edu, adilger.kernel@...ger.ca, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
syzbot+0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] Fix: ext4: guard against EA inode refcount underflow
in xattr update
On Sat, Sep 20, 2025 at 05:13:43AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
> inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
> -1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
> triggering errors like:
>
> EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
> EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
>
> Make the invariant explicit: if the current refcount is non-positive,
> treat this as on-disk corruption, emit ext4_error_inode(), and fail the
> operation with -EFSCORRUPTED instead of updating the refcount. Delete the
> WARN_ONCE() as negative refcounts are now impossible; keep error reporting
> in ext4_error_inode().
>
> This prevents the underflow and the follow-on orphan/cleanup churn.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@...il.com>
> ---
> v2:
> - Move underflow guard before the update
> - Add overflow guard for the opposite case
> - Use u64 type instead s64, since ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() returns u64 and ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref() expects u64.
>
> ---
> fs/ext4/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> index 5a6fe1513fd2..a510693e04ac 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> @@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> int ref_change)
> {
> struct ext4_iloc iloc;
> - s64 ref_count;
> + u64 ref_count;
> int ret;
>
> inode_lock_nested(ea_inode, I_MUTEX_XATTR);
> @@ -1029,13 +1029,17 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> goto out;
>
> ref_count = ext4_xattr_inode_get_ref(ea_inode);
> + if ((ref_count == 0 && ref_change < 0) || (ref_count == U64_MAX && ref_change > 0)) {
/me wonders if you could use check_add_overflow for this, but otherwise
everthing looks fine to me...
> + ext4_error_inode(ea_inode, __func__, __LINE__, 0,
> + "EA inode %lu ref wraparound: ref_count=%lld ref_change=%d",
Nit: %llu since ref_count is now unsigned.
> + ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count, ref_change);
> + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto out;
> + }
> ref_count += ref_change;
> ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref(ea_inode, ref_count);
>
> if (ref_change > 0) {
> - WARN_ONCE(ref_count <= 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
> - ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
> -
> if (ref_count == 1) {
> WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink, "EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
> ea_inode->i_ino, ea_inode->i_nlink);
...though while you're modifying the precondition checking here, I think
these i_nlink preconditions should also be hoisted to the top and cause
an EFSCORRUPTED return on bad inputs.
--D
> @@ -1044,9 +1048,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> ext4_orphan_del(handle, ea_inode);
> }
> } else {
> - WARN_ONCE(ref_count < 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
> - ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
> -
> if (ref_count == 0) {
> WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink != 1,
> "EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
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