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Message-ID: <aNOtTIRBrzN_AAMa@earth.li>
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2025 09:35:24 +0100
From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@...th.li>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...nsys.com>,
Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Remove unnecessary wrapper
On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 02:50:09PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...nsys.com>
>
>Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt() because it adds unnecessary
>disperancy to the call sites (and reduces the amount of code).
>
>Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...nsys.com>
I don't have a strong opinion on whether this is significantly better,
but for 2 call sites it's not unreasonable, so:
Reviewed-By: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@...th.li>
>---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 14 +++++++++++---
> include/linux/tpm.h | 23 -----------------------
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>index 7d77f6fbc152..89e6169add88 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>@@ -257,9 +257,17 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
>
> do {
> tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
>- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT
>- | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
>- NULL, 0);
>+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf,
>+ TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT |
>+ TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
>+ NULL, 0);
>+ } else {
>+ offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
>+ if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
>+ head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
>+ }
> tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
> tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
> err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
>diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
>index 667d290789ca..aaa407ddef21 100644
>--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
>+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
>@@ -534,29 +534,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> int passphraselen);
> void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen);
>-static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>- struct tpm_buf *buf,
>- u8 attributes,
>- u8 *passphrase,
>- int passphraselen)
>-{
>- struct tpm_header *head;
>- int offset;
>-
>- if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, passphraselen);
>- } else {
>- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
>-
>- /*
>- * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to
>- * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS.
>- */
>- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
>- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
>- }
>-}
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
>
>diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>index e165b117bbca..c414a7006d78 100644
>--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>@@ -482,8 +482,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u32 blob_handle)
> {
>+ struct tpm_header *head;
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> u16 data_len;
>+ int offset;
> u8 *data;
> int rc;
>
>@@ -518,8 +520,14 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
> options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>- NULL, 0);
>+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
>+ } else {
>+ offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
>+ if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
>+ head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
>+ }
> }
>
> tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
>--
>2.39.5
>
>
J.
--
"Where else in computing can a random government that isn't even in
your country force you to make a change to your servers on three day's
notice?" -- Russ Allbery on DST
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