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Message-ID: <877bxi2kcj.fsf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 2025 18:00:19 -0600
From: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Jiri Slaby
 <jirislaby@...nel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
 Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@...il.com>, Bill Wendling
 <morbo@...gle.com>, Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>, Paul Moore
 <paul@...l-moore.com>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
 llvm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-serial@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v4] selftests/tty: add TIOCSTI test suite

Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com> writes:

> TIOCSTI is a TTY ioctl command that allows inserting characters into
> the terminal input queue, making it appear as if the user typed those
> characters. This functionality has behavior that varies based on system
> configuration and process credentials.
>
> The dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti sysctl introduced in commit 83efeeeb3d04
> (“tty: Allow TIOCSTI to be disabled”) controls TIOCSTI usage. When
> disabled, TIOCSTI requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
>
> The current implementation checks the current process’s credentials via
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), but does not validate against the file opener’s
> credentials stored in file->f_cred. This creates different behavior when
> file descriptors are passed between processes via SCM_RIGHTS.
>
> Add a test suite with 16 test variants using fixture variants to verify
> TIOCSTI behavior when dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti is enabled/disabled:
>
> - Basic TIOCSTI tests (8 variants): Direct testing with different
>   capability and controlling terminal combinations
> - FD passing tests (8 variants): Test behavior when file descriptors
>   are passed between processes with different capabilities
>
> The FD passing tests document this behavior - some tests show different
> results than expected based on file opener credentials, demonstrating
> that TIOCSTI uses current process credentials rather than file opener
> credentials.
>
> The tests validate proper enforcement of the legacy_tiocsti sysctl. Test
> implementation uses openpty(3) with TIOCSCTTY for isolated PTY
> environments. See tty_ioctl(4) for details on TIOCSTI behavior and
> security requirements.
>
> Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com>
> —
> RESEND: add TTY/serial maintainers and linux-serial CCs. No code changes.
> - Link to orignal v4: <https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250902-toicsti-bug-v4-1-e5c960e0b3d6@gmail.com>
>
> Changes in v4:
> - Moved skip conditions and sysctl setup from TEST_F to FIXTURE_SETUP (Kees Cook)
> - Fixed fclose() error handling in set_legacy_tiocsti_setting (Kees Cook)
> - Extracted run_basic_tiocsti_test() and run_fdpass_tiocsti_test functions (Kees Cook)
> - Removed redundant sysctl restore logic from TEST_F (Kees Cook)
> - Simplified FIXTURE_TEARDOWN (Kees Cook)
> - Replace drop_to_nobody() to drop_all_privs() which should be more portable (Justin Stitt)
> - Link to v3: <https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730-toicsti-bug-v3-1-dd2dac97f27a@gmail.com>
>
> Add selftests for TIOCSTI ioctl
>
> To run all tests:
> $ sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/tty/tty_tiocsti_test
>
> Test Results:
> - PASSED: 13/16 tests
> - Different behavior: 3/16 tests (documenting credential checking behavior)
>
> All tests validated using:
> - scripts/checkpatch.pl –strict (clean output)
> - Functional testing on kernel v6.16-rc2
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Replaced all printf() calls with TH_LOG() for proper test logging (Kees Cook)
> - Added struct __test_metadata parameter to helper functions
> - Moved common legacy_tiocsti availability check to FIXTURE_SETUP()
> - Implemented sysctl modification/restoration in FIXTURE_SETUP/TEARDOWN
> - Used openpty() with TIOCSCTTY for reliable PTY testing environment
> - Fixed child/parent synchronization in FD passing tests
> - Replaced manual _exit(1) handling with proper ASSERT statements
> - Switched // comments to /* */ format throughout
> - Expanded to 16 test variants using fixture variants
> - Enhanced error handling and test reliability
> - Link to v2: <https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250713-toicsti-bug-v2-1-b183787eea29@gmail.com>
> - Link to v1: <https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250622-toicsti-bug-v1-0-f374373b04b2@gmail.com>
>
> References:
> - tty_ioctl(4) - documents TIOCSTI ioctl and capability requirements
> - openpty(3) - pseudo-terminal creation and management
> - commit 83efeeeb3d04 (“tty: Allow TIOCSTI to be disabled”)
> - Documentation/security/credentials.rst
> - <https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/156>
> - <https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/Y0m9l52AKmw6Yxi1@hostpad/>
> - drivers/tty/Kconfig
> - Documentation/driver-api/tty/
> —
>  tools/testing/selftests/tty/Makefile           |   6 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/tty/config             |   1 +
>  tools/testing/selftests/tty/tty_tiocsti_test.c | 650 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 656 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff –git a/tools/testing/selftests/tty/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/tty/Makefile
> index 50d7027b2ae3fb495dd1c0684363fa8f426be42c..7f6fbe5a0cd5663310e334d9d068b21dab9136ec 100644
> — a/tools/testing/selftests/tty/Makefile
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tty/Makefile
> @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
>  # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>  CFLAGS = -O2 -Wall
> -TEST_GEN_PROGS := tty_tstamp_update
> +TEST_GEN_PROGS := tty_tstamp_update tty_tiocsti_test
> +LDLIBS += -lcap
>  
>  include ../lib.mk
> +
> +# Add libcap for TIOCSTI test
> +$(OUTPUT)/tty_tiocsti_test: LDLIBS += -lcap
> diff –git a/tools/testing/selftests/tty/config b/tools/testing/selftests/tty/config
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6373aba66366c82435bb26c019eb360eb6310eb
> — /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tty/config
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +CONFIG_LEGACY_TIOCSTI=y
> diff –git a/tools/testing/selftests/tty/tty_tiocsti_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/tty/tty_tiocsti_test.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e767e6cb3ef8f05c5430eb0fcc792064c446c03
> — /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tty/tty_tiocsti_test.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * TTY Tests - TIOCSTI
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2025 Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@...il.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <stdbool.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <sys/wait.h>
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <termios.h>
> +#include <grp.h>
> +#include <sys/capability.h>
> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
> +#include <pty.h>
> +#include <utmp.h>
> +
> +#include “../kselftest_harness.h”
> +
> +enum test_type {
> +	TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	/* other tests cases such as serial may be added. */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Test Strategy:
> + * - Basic tests: Use PTY with/without TIOCSCTTY (controlling terminal for
> + *   current process)
> + * - FD passing tests: Child creates PTY, parent receives FD (demonstrates
> + *   security issue)
> + *
> + * SECURITY VULNERABILITY DEMONSTRATION:
> + * FD passing tests show that TIOCSTI uses CURRENT process credentials, not
> + * opener credentials. This means privileged processes can be given FDs from
> + * unprivileged processes and successfully perform TIOCSTI operations that the
> + * unprivileged process couldn’t do directly.
> + *
> + * Attack scenario:
> + * 1. Unprivileged process opens TTY (direct TIOCSTI fails due to lack of
> + *    privileges)
> + * 2. Unprivileged process passes FD to privileged process via SCM_RIGHTS
> + * 3. Privileged process can use TIOCSTI on the FD (succeeds due to its
> + *    privileges)
> + * 4. Result: Effective privilege escalation via file descriptor passing
> + *
> + * This matches the kernel logic in tiocsti():
> + * 1. if (!tty_legacy_tiocsti && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EIO;
> + * 2. if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + *        return -EPERM;
> + * Note: Both checks use capable() on CURRENT process, not FD opener!
> + *
> + * If the file credentials were also checked along with the capable() checks
> + * then the results for FD pass tests would be consistent with the basic tests.
> + */
> +
> +FIXTURE(tiocsti)
> +{
> +	int pty_master_fd; /* PTY - for basic tests */
> +	int pty_slave_fd;
> +	bool has_pty;
> +	bool initial_cap_sys_admin;
> +	int original_legacy_tiocsti_setting;
> +	bool can_modify_sysctl;
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(tiocsti)
> +{
> +	const enum test_type test_type;
> +	const bool controlling_tty; /* true=current->signal->tty `= tty */
> +	const int legacy_tiocsti; /* 0=restricted, 1=permissive */
> +	const bool requires_cap; /* true=with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, false=without */
> +	const int expected_success; /* 0=success, -EIO/-EPERM=specific error */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Tests Controlling Terminal Variants (current->signal->tty =' tty)
> + *
> + * TIOCSTI Test Matrix:
> + *
> + * | legacy_tiocsti | CAP_SYS_ADMIN | Expected Result | Error |
> + * |—————-|—————|—————–|——-|
> + * | 1 (permissive) | true          | SUCCESS         | -     |
> + * | 1 (permissive) | false         | SUCCESS         | -     |
> + * | 0 (restricted) | true          | SUCCESS         | -     |
> + * | 0 (restricted) | false         | FAILURE         | -EIO  |
> + */
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_pty_permissive_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_pty_permissive_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_pty_restricted_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_pty_restricted_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = -EIO, /* FAILURE: legacy restriction */
> +}; /* clang-format on */
> +
> +/*
> + * Note for FD Passing Test Variants
> + * Since we’re testing the scenario where an unprivileged process pass an FD
> + * to a privileged one, .requires_cap here means the caps of the child process.
> + * Not the parent; parent would always be privileged.
> + */
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_pty_permissive_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_pty_permissive_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_pty_restricted_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_pty_restricted_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = true,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = -EIO,
> +}; /* clang-format on */
> +
> +/*
> + * Non-Controlling Terminal Variants (current->signal->tty != tty)
> + *
> + * TIOCSTI Test Matrix:
> + *
> + * | legacy_tiocsti | CAP_SYS_ADMIN | Expected Result | Error |
> + * |—————-|—————|—————–|——-|
> + * | 1 (permissive) | true          | SUCCESS         | -     |
> + * | 1 (permissive) | false         | FAILURE         | -EPERM|
> + * | 0 (restricted) | true          | SUCCESS         | -     |
> + * | 0 (restricted) | false         | FAILURE         | -EIO  |
> + */
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_nopty_permissive_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_nopty_permissive_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = -EPERM,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_nopty_restricted_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, basic_nopty_restricted_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = -EIO,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_nopty_permissive_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_nopty_permissive_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 1,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = -EPERM,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_nopty_restricted_withcap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = true,
> +	.expected_success = 0,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tiocsti, fdpass_nopty_restricted_nocap) {
> +	.test_type = TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING,
> +	.controlling_tty = false,
> +	.legacy_tiocsti = 0,
> +	.requires_cap = false,
> +	.expected_success = -EIO,
> +}; /* clang-format on */
> +
> +/* Helper function to send FD via SCM_RIGHTS */
> +static int send_fd_via_socket(int socket_fd, int fd_to_send)
> +{
> +	struct msghdr msg = { 0 };
> +	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> +	char cmsg_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
> +	char dummy_data = ’F’;
> +	struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = &dummy_data, .iov_len = 1 };
> +
> +	msg.msg_iov = &iov;
> +	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +	msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf;
> +	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_buf);
> +
> +	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> +	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> +	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> +	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
> +
> +	memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &fd_to_send, sizeof(int));
> +
> +	return sendmsg(socket_fd, &msg, 0) < 0 ? -1 : 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* Helper function to receive FD via SCM_RIGHTS */
> +static int recv_fd_via_socket(int socket_fd)
> +{
> +	struct msghdr msg = { 0 };
> +	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> +	char cmsg_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
> +	char dummy_data;
> +	struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = &dummy_data, .iov_len = 1 };
> +	int received_fd = -1;
> +
> +	msg.msg_iov = &iov;
> +	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +	msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf;
> +	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_buf);
> +
> +	if (recvmsg(socket_fd, &msg, 0) < 0)
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg)) {
> +		if (cmsg->cmsg_level `= SOL_SOCKET &&
> +		    cmsg->cmsg_type =' SCM_RIGHTS) {
> +			memcpy(&received_fd, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(int));
> +			break;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	return received_fd;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool has_cap_sys_admin(void)
> +{
> +	cap_t caps = cap_get_proc();
> +
> +	if (!caps)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	cap_flag_value_t cap_val;
> +	bool has_cap = (cap_get_flag(caps, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_EFFECTIVE,
> +				     &cap_val) `= 0) &&
> +		       (cap_val =' CAP_SET);
> +
> +	cap_free(caps);
> +	return has_cap;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Switch to non-root user and clear all capabilities
> + */
> +static inline bool drop_all_privs(struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
> +{
> +	/* Drop supplementary groups */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(setgroups(0, NULL), 0);
> +
> +	/* Switch to non-root user */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(setgid(1000), 0);
> +	ASSERT_EQ(setuid(1000), 0);
> +
> +	/* Clear all capabilities */
> +	cap_t empty = cap_init();
> +
> +	ASSERT_NE(empty, NULL);
> +	ASSERT_EQ(cap_set_proc(empty), 0);
> +	cap_free(empty);
> +
> +	/* Prevent privilege regain */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0), 0);
> +
> +	/* Verify privilege drop */
> +	ASSERT_FALSE(has_cap_sys_admin());
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int get_legacy_tiocsti_setting(struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
> +{
> +	FILE *fp;
> +	int value = -1;
> +
> +	fp = fopen(“/proc/sys/dev/tty/legacy_tiocsti”, “r”);
> +	if (!fp) {
> +		/* legacy_tiocsti sysctl not available (kernel < 6.2) */
> +		return -1;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (fscanf(fp, “%d”, &value) `= 1 && fclose(fp) =' 0) {
> +		if (value < 0 || value > 1)
> +			value = -1; /* Invalid value */
> +	} else {
> +		value = -1; /* Failed to parse */
> +	}
> +
> +	return value;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool set_legacy_tiocsti_setting(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
> +					      int value)
> +{
> +	FILE *fp;
> +	bool success = false;
> +
> +	/* Sanity-check the value */
> +	ASSERT_GE(value, 0);
> +	ASSERT_LE(value, 1);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Try to open for writing; if we lack permission, return false so
> +	 * the test harness will skip variants that need to change it
> +	 */
> +	fp = fopen(“/proc/sys/dev/tty/legacy_tiocsti”, “w”);
> +	if (!fp)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* Write the new setting */
> +	if (fprintf(fp, “%d\n”, value) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0)
> +		success = true;
> +	else
> +		TH_LOG(“Failed to write legacy_tiocsti: %s”, strerror(errno));
> +
> +	return success;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * TIOCSTI injection test function
> + * @tty_fd: TTY slave file descriptor to test TIOCSTI on
> + * Returns: 0 on success, -errno on failure
> + */
> +static inline int test_tiocsti_injection(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
> +					 int tty_fd)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +	char inject_char = ’V’;
> +
> +	errno = 0;
> +	ret = ioctl(tty_fd, TIOCSTI, &inject_char);
> +	return ret == 0 ? 0 : -errno;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Child process: test TIOCSTI directly with capability/controlling
> + * terminal setup
> + */
> +static void run_basic_tiocsti_test(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
> +				   FIXTURE_DATA(tiocsti) * self,
> +				   const FIXTURE_VARIANT(tiocsti) * variant)
> +{
> +	/* Handle capability requirements */
> +	if (self->initial_cap_sys_admin && !variant->requires_cap)
> +		ASSERT_TRUE(drop_all_privs(_metadata));
> +
> +	if (variant->controlling_tty) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Create new session and set PTY as
> +		 * controlling terminal
> +		 */
> +		pid_t sid = setsid();
> +
> +		ASSERT_GE(sid, 0);
> +		ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(self->pty_slave_fd, TIOCSCTTY, 0), 0);
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Validate test environment setup and verify final
> +	 * capability state matches expectation
> +	 * after potential drop.
> +	 */
> +	ASSERT_TRUE(self->has_pty);
> +	ASSERT_EQ(has_cap_sys_admin(), variant->requires_cap);
> +
> +	/* Test TIOCSTI and validate result */
> +	int result = test_tiocsti_injection(_metadata, self->pty_slave_fd);
> +
> +	/* Check against expected result from variant */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(result, variant->expected_success);
> +	_exit(0);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Child process: create PTY and then pass FD to parent via SCM_RIGHTS
> + */
> +static void run_fdpass_tiocsti_test(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
> +				    const FIXTURE_VARIANT(tiocsti) * variant,
> +				    int sockfd)
> +{
> +	signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
> +
> +	/* Handle privilege dropping */
> +	if (!variant->requires_cap && has_cap_sys_admin())
> +		ASSERT_TRUE(drop_all_privs(_metadata));
> +
> +	/* Create child’s PTY */
> +	int child_master_fd, child_slave_fd;
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(openpty(&child_master_fd, &child_slave_fd, NULL, NULL, NULL),
> +		  0);
> +
> +	if (variant->controlling_tty) {
> +		pid_t sid = setsid();
> +
> +		ASSERT_GE(sid, 0);
> +		ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(child_slave_fd, TIOCSCTTY, 0), 0);
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Test child’s direct TIOCSTI for reference */
> +	int direct_result = test_tiocsti_injection(_metadata, child_slave_fd);
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(direct_result, variant->expected_success);
> +
> +	/* Send FD to parent */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(send_fd_via_socket(sockfd, child_slave_fd), 0);
> +
> +	/* Wait for parent completion signal */
> +	char sync_byte;
> +	ssize_t bytes_read = read(sockfd, &sync_byte, 1);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(bytes_read, 1);
> +
> +	close(child_master_fd);
> +	close(child_slave_fd);
> +	close(sockfd);
> +	_exit(0);
> +}
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(tiocsti)
> +{
> +	/* Create PTY pair for basic tests */
> +	self->has_pty = (openpty(&self->pty_master_fd, &self->pty_slave_fd,
> +				 NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0);
> +	if (!self->has_pty) {
> +		self->pty_master_fd = -1;
> +		self->pty_slave_fd = -1;
> +	}
> +
> +	self->initial_cap_sys_admin = has_cap_sys_admin();
> +	self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting =
> +		get_legacy_tiocsti_setting(_metadata);
> +
> +	if (self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting < 0)
> +		SKIP(return,
> +			   “legacy_tiocsti sysctl not available (kernel < 6.2)”);
> +
> +	/* Common skip conditions */
> +	if (variant->test_type `= TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC && !self->has_pty)
> +		SKIP(return, "PTY not available for controlling terminal test");
> +
> +	if (variant->test_type =' TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_FD_PASSING &&
> +	    !self->initial_cap_sys_admin)
> +		SKIP(return, “FD Pass tests require CAP_SYS_ADMIN”);
> +
> +	if (variant->requires_cap && !self->initial_cap_sys_admin)
> +		SKIP(return, “Test requires initial CAP_SYS_ADMIN”);
> +
> +	/* Test if we can modify the sysctl (requires appropriate privileges) */
> +	self->can_modify_sysctl = set_legacy_tiocsti_setting(
> +		_metadata, self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting);
> +
> +	/* Sysctl setup based on variant */
> +	if (self->can_modify_sysctl &&
> +	    self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting != variant->legacy_tiocsti) {
> +		if (!set_legacy_tiocsti_setting(_metadata,
> +						variant->legacy_tiocsti))
> +			SKIP(return, “Failed to set legacy_tiocsti sysctl”);
> +
> +	} else if (!self->can_modify_sysctl &&
> +		   self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting !=
> +			   variant->legacy_tiocsti)
> +		SKIP(return, “legacy_tiocsti setting mismatch”);
> +}
> +
> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(tiocsti)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Backup restoration -
> +	 * each test should restore its own sysctl changes
> +	 */
> +	if (self->can_modify_sysctl) {
> +		int current_value = get_legacy_tiocsti_setting(_metadata);
> +
> +		if (current_value != self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting) {
> +			TH_LOG(“Backup: Restoring legacy_tiocsti from %d to %d”,
> +			       current_value,
> +			       self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting);
> +			set_legacy_tiocsti_setting(
> +				_metadata,
> +				self->original_legacy_tiocsti_setting);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	if (self->has_pty) {
> +		if (self->pty_master_fd >= 0)
> +			close(self->pty_master_fd);
> +		if (self->pty_slave_fd >= 0)
> +			close(self->pty_slave_fd);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F(tiocsti, test)
> +{
> +	int status;
> +	pid_t child_pid;
> +
> +	if (variant->test_type == TEST_PTY_TIOCSTI_BASIC) {
> +		/* `===' BASIC TIOCSTI TEST `===' */
> +		child_pid = fork();
> +		ASSERT_GE(child_pid, 0);
> +
> +		/* Perform the actual test in the child process */
> +		if (child_pid == 0)
> +			run_basic_tiocsti_test(_metadata, self, variant);
> +
> +	} else {
> +		/* `===' FD PASSING SECURITY TEST `===' */
> +		int sockpair[2];
> +
> +		ASSERT_EQ(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sockpair), 0);
> +
> +		child_pid = fork();
> +		ASSERT_GE(child_pid, 0);
> +
> +		if (child_pid == 0) {
> +			/* Child process - create PTY and send FD */
> +			close(sockpair[0]);
> +			run_fdpass_tiocsti_test(_metadata, variant,
> +						sockpair[1]);
> +		}
> +
> +		/* Parent process - receive FD and test TIOCSTI */
> +		close(sockpair[1]);
> +
> +		int received_fd = recv_fd_via_socket(sockpair[0]);
> +
> +		ASSERT_GE(received_fd, 0);
> +
> +		bool parent_has_cap = self->initial_cap_sys_admin;
> +
> +		TH_LOG(“`=' TIOCSTI FD Passing Test Context `='”);
> +		TH_LOG(“legacy_tiocsti: %d, Parent CAP_SYS_ADMIN: %s, Child: %s”,
> +		       variant->legacy_tiocsti, parent_has_cap ? “yes” : “no”,
> +		       variant->requires_cap ? “kept” : “dropped”);
> +
> +		/* SECURITY TEST: Try TIOCSTI with FD opened by child */
> +		int result = test_tiocsti_injection(_metadata, received_fd);
> +
> +		/* Log security concern if demonstrated */
> +		if (result == 0 && !variant->requires_cap) {
> +			TH_LOG("*** SECURITY CONCERN DEMONSTRATED ***“);
> +			TH_LOG(”Privileged parent can use TIOCSTI on FD from unprivileged child“);
> +			TH_LOG(”This shows current process credentials are used, not opener credentials“);
> +		}
> +
> +		EXPECT_EQ(result, variant->expected_success)
> +		{
> +			TH_LOG(”FD passing: expected error %d, got %d“,
> +			       variant->expected_success, result);
> +		}
> +
> +		/* Signal child completion */
> +		char sync_byte = ‘D’;
> +		ssize_t bytes_written = write(sockpair[0], &sync_byte, 1);
> +
> +		ASSERT_EQ(bytes_written, 1);
> +
> +		close(received_fd);
> +		close(sockpair[0]);
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Common child process cleanup for both test types */
> +	ASSERT_EQ(waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0), child_pid);
> +
> +	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
> +		TH_LOG(”Child terminated by signal %d“, WTERMSIG(status));
> +		ASSERT_FALSE(WIFSIGNALED(status))
> +		{
> +			TH_LOG(”Child process failed assertion");
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(status), 0);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
>
> —
> base-commit: e6b9dce0aeeb91dfc0974ab87f02454e24566182
> change-id: 20250618-toicsti-bug-7822b8e94a32
>
> Best regards,


Hi TTY Maintainers,

I had submitted this patch series a couple of weeks ago and wanted to
gently ping to see if you’ve had a chance to review it.

Also, if you have any other concerns or questions, I would be happy to
address them.


Best,
Abhinav

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