linux-kernel - Re: 6.17 crashes in ipv6 code when booted fips=1 [was: [GIT PULL] Crypto Update for 6.17]

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Message-ID: <0acd44b257938b927515034dd3954e2d36fc65ac.camel@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2025 15:45:46 -0400
From: Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Vegard Nossum
 <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Jiri Slaby	
 <jirislaby@...nel.org>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "David S.
 Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Linux Kernel Mailing List
 <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux Crypto Mailing List
 <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski
 <kuba@...nel.org>, Theodore Ts'o	 <tytso@....edu>, "nstange@...e.de"
 <nstange@...e.de>, "Wang, Jay"	 <wanjay@...zon.com>
Subject: Re: 6.17 crashes in ipv6 code when booted fips=1 [was: [GIT PULL]
 Crypto Update for 6.17]

On Mon, 2025-10-06 at 19:26 +0000, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 06, 2025 at 09:11:41PM +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote:
> > The fact is that fips=1 is not useful if it doesn't actually result
> > something that complies with the standard; the only purpose of fips=1 is
> > to allow the kernel to be used and certified as a FIPS module.
> 
> Don't all the distros doing this actually carry out-of-tree patches to
> fix up some things required for certification that upstream has never
> done?  So that puts the upstream fips=1 support in an awkward place,
> where it's always been an unfinished (and undocumented) feature.

FWIW downstream patching, at least until recently, has been minimal.
The upstream behavior has been good enough to be representative of the
behavior you would expect from a certified binary.

Note: this may change going forward, but I am confident that as issues
arise people will propose upstream patches to keep it as close as
possible within acceptable parameters for upstream behavior.

-- 
Simo Sorce
Distinguished Engineer
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat, Inc