linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v9 mm-new 07/11] bpf: mark vma->vm_mm as __safe_trusted_or

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Message-ID: <CAEf4BzaGRDiW3fRt3i+7vvRB+oQszKjaLWVMSU6JrfmXHsJ45w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2025 14:06:50 -0700
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
To: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, david@...hat.com, ziy@...dia.com, 
	baolin.wang@...ux.alibaba.com, lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com, 
	Liam.Howlett@...cle.com, npache@...hat.com, ryan.roberts@....com, 
	dev.jain@....com, hannes@...xchg.org, usamaarif642@...il.com, 
	gutierrez.asier@...wei-partners.com, willy@...radead.org, ast@...nel.org, 
	daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org, ameryhung@...il.com, 
	rientjes@...gle.com, corbet@....net, 21cnbao@...il.com, 
	shakeel.butt@...ux.dev, tj@...nel.org, lance.yang@...ux.dev, 
	rdunlap@...radead.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 mm-new 07/11] bpf: mark vma->vm_mm as __safe_trusted_or_null

On Mon, Sep 29, 2025 at 11:00 PM Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com> wrote:
>
> The vma->vm_mm might be NULL and it can be accessed outside of RCU. Thus,
> we can mark it as trusted_or_null. With this change, BPF helpers can safely
> access vma->vm_mm to retrieve the associated mm_struct from the VMA.
> Then we can make policy decision from the VMA.
>
> The "trusted" annotation enables direct access to vma->vm_mm within kfuncs
> marked with KF_TRUSTED_ARGS or KF_RCU, such as bpf_task_get_cgroup1() and
> bpf_task_under_cgroup(). Conversely, "null" enforcement requires all
> callsites using vma->vm_mm to perform NULL checks.
>
> The lsm selftest must be modified because it directly accesses vma->vm_mm
> without a NULL pointer check; otherwise it will break due to this
> change.
>
> For the VMA based THP policy, the use case is as follows,
>
>   @mm = @vma->vm_mm; // vm_area_struct::vm_mm is trusted or null
>   if (!@mm)
>       return;
>   bpf_rcu_read_lock(); // rcu lock must be held to dereference the owner
>   @owner = @mm->owner; // mm_struct::owner is rcu trusted or null
>   if (!@...er)
>     goto out;
>   @cgroup1 = bpf_task_get_cgroup1(@owner, MEMCG_HIERARCHY_ID);
>
>   /* make the decision based on the @cgroup1 attribute */
>
>   bpf_cgroup_release(@cgroup1); // release the associated cgroup
> out:
>   bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
>
> PSI memory information can be obtained from the associated cgroup to inform
> policy decisions. Since upstream PSI support is currently limited to cgroup
> v2, the following example demonstrates cgroup v2 implementation:
>
>   @owner = @mm->owner;
>   if (@owner) {
>       // @ancestor_cgid is user-configured
>       @ancestor = bpf_cgroup_from_id(@ancestor_cgid);
>       if (bpf_task_under_cgroup(@owner, @ancestor)) {
>           @psi_group = @ancestor->psi;
>
>           /* Extract PSI metrics from @psi_group and
>            * implement policy logic based on the values
>            */
>
>       }
>   }
>
> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
> Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
> Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c                   | 5 +++++
>  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 8 +++++---
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>

Hey Yafang,

This looks like a generally useful change, so I think it would be best
if you can send it as a stand-alone patch to bpf-next to land it
sooner.

Also, am I imagining this, or did you have similar change for the
vm_file field as well? Any reasons to not mark vm_file as trusted as
well?

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index d400e18ee31e..b708b98f796c 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -7165,6 +7165,10 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) {
>         struct sock *sk;
>  };
>
> +BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) {
> +       struct mm_struct *vm_mm;
> +};
> +
>  static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>                         struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
>                         const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
> @@ -7206,6 +7210,7 @@ static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  {
>         BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket));
>         BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry));
> +       BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct));
>
>         return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id,
>                                           "__safe_trusted_or_null");
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> index 0c13b7409947..7de173daf27b 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> @@ -89,14 +89,16 @@ SEC("lsm/file_mprotect")
>  int BPF_PROG(test_int_hook, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>              unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, int ret)
>  {
> -       if (ret != 0)
> +       struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> +
> +       if (ret != 0 || !mm)
>                 return ret;
>
>         __s32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
>         int is_stack = 0;
>
> -       is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
> -                   vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack);
> +       is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
> +                   vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack);
>
>         if (is_stack && monitored_pid == pid) {
>                 mprotect_count++;
> --
> 2.47.3
>