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Message-ID: <8cc8306a5608f68d6de7ed367afb50fc382e1cf4.camel@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2025 20:38:20 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "Mehta, Sohil" <sohil.mehta@...el.com>, "Hansen, Dave"
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 01/15] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
On Tue, 2025-10-07 at 13:20 -0700, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> > STAC/CLAC are also architected to:
> >
> > #UD - If CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0H):EBX.SMAP[bit 20] = 0.
> >
> > So, even though LASS _technically_ doesn't require SMAP, it would be a
> > real pain without SMAP and STAC/CLAC. Thus, this series relies on SMAP
> > being present.
Ah, ok.
>
>
> The spec says,
> "A supervisor-mode data access causes a LASS violation if it would
> access a linear address of which bit 63 is 0, supervisor-mode access
> protection is enabled (by setting CR4.SMAP), and either RFLAGS.AC = 0 or
> the access is an implicit supervisor-mode access."
>
> One could argue that the LASS hardware enforcement of the kernel data
> accesses *depends* on SMAP being enabled.
The fetch part doesn't though?
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