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Message-ID: <aO9ZiERHff7vQiBL@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2025 11:21:28 +0300
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...een.com>
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, brauner@...nel.org, corbet@....net,
graf@...zon.com, jgg@...pe.ca, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
masahiroy@...nel.org, ojeda@...nel.org, pratyush@...nel.org,
rdunlap@...radead.org, tj@...nel.org, jasonmiu@...gle.com,
dmatlack@...gle.com, skhawaja@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] liveupdate: kho: warn and fail on metadata or
preserved memory in scratch area
Hi Pasha,
On Wed, Oct 15, 2025 at 01:31:20AM -0400, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
>
> Subject: [PATCH 1/2] liveupdate: kho: warn and fail on metadata or preserved memory in scratch area
Hmm, can't say I like liveupdate: kho: prefix. KHO: on it's own is shorter
and reflects that this is a KHO change rather than liveupdate.
> It is invalid for KHO metadata or preserved memory regions to be located
> within the KHO scratch area, as this area is overwritten when the next
> kernel is loaded, and used early in boot by the next kernel. This can
> lead to memory corruption.
>
> Adds checks to kho_preserve_* and KHO's internal metadata allocators
> (xa_load_or_alloc, new_chunk) to verify that the physical address of the
> memory does not overlap with any defined scratch region. If an overlap
> is detected, the operation will fail and a WARN_ON is triggered. To
> avoid performance overhead in production kernels, these checks are
> enabled only when CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG is selected.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...een.com>
> ---
> kernel/liveupdate/Kconfig | 15 ++++++++++
Feels like kernel/liveupdate/Makefile change is missing
> kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++---
> kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover_debug.c | 18 ++++++++++++
> kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover_internal.h | 9 ++++++
> 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/liveupdate/Kconfig b/kernel/liveupdate/Kconfig
> index 522b9f74d605..d119f4f3f4b1 100644
> --- a/kernel/liveupdate/Kconfig
> +++ b/kernel/liveupdate/Kconfig
> @@ -27,4 +27,19 @@ config KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUGFS
> Also, enables inspecting the KHO fdt trees with the debugfs binary
> blobs.
>
> +config KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUG
> + bool "Enable Kexec Handover debug checks"
> + depends on KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUGFS
> + help
> + This option enables extra sanity checks for the Kexec Handover
> + subsystem.
> +
> + These checks verify that neither preserved memory regions nor KHO's
> + internal metadata are allocated from within a KHO scratch area.
> + An overlap can lead to memory corruption during a subsequent kexec
> + operation.
> +
> + If an overlap is detected, the kernel will print a warning and the
> + offending operation will fail. This should only be enabled for
> + debugging purposes due to runtime overhead.
> endmenu
> diff --git a/kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover.c b/kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover.c
> index 5da21f1510cc..ef1e6f7a234b 100644
> --- a/kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover.c
> +++ b/kernel/liveupdate/kexec_handover.c
> @@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ static void *xa_load_or_alloc(struct xarray *xa, unsigned long index, size_t sz)
> if (!elm)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
> + if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(virt_to_phys(elm), sz))) {
> + kfree(elm);
I think __free() cleanup would be better than this.
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + }
> +
> res = xa_cmpxchg(xa, index, NULL, elm, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (xa_is_err(res))
> res = ERR_PTR(xa_err(res));
> @@ -354,7 +359,13 @@ static struct khoser_mem_chunk *new_chunk(struct khoser_mem_chunk *cur_chunk,
>
> chunk = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!chunk)
> - return NULL;
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
I don't think it's important to return -errno here, it's not that it's
called from a syscall and we need to set errno for the userspace.
BTW, the same applies to xa_load_or_alloc() IMO.
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(virt_to_phys(chunk), PAGE_SIZE))) {
> + kfree(chunk);
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + }
> +
> chunk->hdr.order = order;
> if (cur_chunk)
> KHOSER_STORE_PTR(cur_chunk->hdr.next, chunk);
> @@ -379,14 +390,17 @@ static int kho_mem_serialize(struct kho_out *kho_out)
> struct khoser_mem_chunk *chunk = NULL;
> struct kho_mem_phys *physxa;
> unsigned long order;
> + int ret = -ENOMEM;
>
> xa_for_each(&kho_out->track.orders, order, physxa) {
> struct kho_mem_phys_bits *bits;
> unsigned long phys;
>
> chunk = new_chunk(chunk, order);
> - if (!chunk)
> + if (IS_ERR(chunk)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(chunk);
... and indeed, -errno from new_chunk() juts makes things more complex :(
> goto err_free;
> + }
>
> if (!first_chunk)
> first_chunk = chunk;
> @@ -396,8 +410,10 @@ static int kho_mem_serialize(struct kho_out *kho_out)
>
> if (chunk->hdr.num_elms == ARRAY_SIZE(chunk->bitmaps)) {
> chunk = new_chunk(chunk, order);
> - if (!chunk)
> + if (IS_ERR(chunk)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(chunk);
> goto err_free;
> + }
> }
>
> elm = &chunk->bitmaps[chunk->hdr.num_elms];
> @@ -414,7 +430,7 @@ static int kho_mem_serialize(struct kho_out *kho_out)
>
> err_free:
> kho_mem_ser_free(first_chunk);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> }
>
> static void __init deserialize_bitmap(unsigned int order,
> @@ -737,6 +753,9 @@ int kho_preserve_folio(struct folio *folio)
> const unsigned int order = folio_order(folio);
> struct kho_mem_track *track = &kho_out.track;
>
> + if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_SIZE << order)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> return __kho_preserve_order(track, pfn, order);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kho_preserve_folio);
> @@ -784,6 +803,11 @@ int kho_preserve_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int nr_pages)
> unsigned long failed_pfn = 0;
> int err = 0;
>
> + if (WARN_ON(kho_scratch_overlap(start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
> + nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT))) {
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
Can't we check this in __kho_preseve_order() and not duplicate the code?
> +
> while (pfn < end_pfn) {
> const unsigned int order =
> min(count_trailing_zeros(pfn), ilog2(end_pfn - pfn));
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
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