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Message-ID: <20251021-agieren-spruch-65c107748c09@brauner>
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2025 14:38:38 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>, Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@...istor.com>,
Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@...istor.com>, Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>, linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org,
openafs-devel@...nafs.org, linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Etienne Champetier <champetier.etienne@...il.com>, Chet Ramey <chet.ramey@...e.edu>,
Cheyenne Wills <cwills@...enomine.net>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] vfs: Allow filesystems with foreign owner IDs to
override UID checks
On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 02:35:44PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> A number of ownership checks made by the VFS make a number of assumptions:
>
> (1) that it is meaningful to compare inode->i_uid to a second ->i_uid or
> to current_fsuid(),
>
> (2) that current_fsuid() represents the subject of the action,
>
> (3) that the number in ->i_uid belong to the system's ID space and
>
> (4) that the IDs can be represented by 32-bit integers.
>
> Network filesystems, however, may violate all four of these assumptions.
> Indeed, a network filesystem may not even have an actual concept of a UNIX
> integer UID (cifs without POSIX extensions, for example). Plug-in block
> filesystems (e.g. USB drives) may also violate this assumption.
>
> In particular, AFS implements its own ACL security model with its own
> per-cell user ID space with 64-bit IDs for some server variants. The
> subject is represented by a token in a key, not current_fsuid(). The AFS
> user IDs and the system user IDs for a cell may be numerically equivalent,
> but that's matter of administrative policy and should perhaps be noted in
> the cell definition or by mount option. A subsequent patch will address
> AFS.
>
> To help fix this, three functions are defined to perform UID comparison
> within the VFS:
>
> (1) vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(). This defaults to comparing i_uid to
> current_fsuid(), with appropriate namespace mapping, assuming that the
> fsuid identifies the subject of the action. The filesystem may
> override it by implementing an inode op:
>
> int (*is_owned_by_me)(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode);
>
> This should return 0 if owned, 1 if not or an error if there's some
> sort of lookup failure. It may use a means of identifying the subject
> of the action other than fsuid, for example by using an authentication
> token stored in a key.
>
> (2) vfs_inodes_have_same_owner(). This defaults to comparing the i_uids
> of two different inodes with appropriate namespace mapping. The
> filesystem may override it by implementing another inode op:
>
> int (*have_same_owner)(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode1,
> struct inode *inode2);
>
> Again, this should return 0 if matching, 1 if not or an error if
> there's some sort of lookup failure.
>
> (3) vfs_inode_and_dir_have_same_owner(). This is similar to (2), but
> assumes that the second inode is the parent directory to the first and
> takes a nameidata struct instead of a second inode pointer.
>
> Fix a number of places within the VFS where such UID checks are made that
> should be deferring interpretation to the filesystem.
>
> (*) chown_ok()
> (*) chgrp_ok()
>
> Call vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(). Possibly these need to defer all
> their checks to the network filesystem as the interpretation of the
> new UID/GID depends on the netfs too, but the ->setattr() method gets
> a chance to deal with that.
>
> (*) coredump_file()
>
> Call vfs_is_owned_by_me() to check that the file created is owned by
> the caller - but the check that's there might be sufficient.
>
> (*) inode_owner_or_capable()
>
> Call vfs_is_owned_by_me(). I'm not sure whether the namespace mapping
> makes sense in such a case, but it probably could be used.
>
> (*) vfs_setlease()
>
> Call vfs_is_owned_by_me(). Actually, it should query if leasing is
> permitted.
>
> Also, setting locks could perhaps do with a permission call to the
> filesystem driver as AFS, for example, has a lock permission bit in
> the ACL, but since the AFS server checks that when the RPC call is
> made, it's probably unnecessary.
>
> (*) acl_permission_check()
> (*) posix_acl_permission()
>
> Unchanged. These functions are only used by generic_permission()
> which is overridden if ->permission() is supplied, and when evaluating
> a POSIX ACL, it should arguably be checking the UID anyway.
>
> AFS, for example, implements its own ACLs and evaluates them in
> ->permission() and on the server.
>
> (*) may_follow_link()
>
> Call vfs_inode_and_dir_have_same_owner() and vfs_is_owned_by_me() on
> the the link and its parent dir.
>
> (*) may_create_in_sticky()
>
> Call vfs_is_owned_by_me() and also vfs_inode_and_dir_have_same_owner()
> both.
>
> [?] Should this return ok immediately if the open call we're in
> created the file being checked.
>
> (*) __check_sticky()
>
> Call vfs_is_owned_by_me() on both the dir and the inode, but for AFS
> vfs_is_owned_by_me() on a directory doesn't work, so call
> vfs_inodes_have_same_owner() instead to check the directory (as is
> done in may_create_in_sticky()).
>
> (*) may_dedupe_file()
>
> Call vfs_is_owned_by_me().
>
> (*) IMA policy ops.
>
> Unchanged for now. I'm not sure what the best way to deal with this
> is - if, indeed, it needs any changes.
>
> Note that wrapping stuff up into vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me() isn't
> necessarily the most efficient as it means we may end up doing the uid
> idmapping an extra time - though this is only done in three places, all to
> do with world-writable sticky dir checks.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> cc: Etienne Champetier <champetier.etienne@...il.com>
> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@...istor.com>
> cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@...istor.com>
> cc: Chet Ramey <chet.ramey@...e.edu>
> cc: Cheyenne Wills <cwills@...enomine.net>
> cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> cc: Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>
> cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> cc: linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org
> cc: openafs-devel@...nafs.org
> cc: linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org
> cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
> cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> Link: https://groups.google.com/g/gnu.bash.bug/c/6PPTfOgFdL4/m/2AQU-S1N76UJ
> Link: https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/tree/redir.c?h=bash-5.3-rc1#n733
> ---
> Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst | 21 ++++
> fs/attr.c | 58 ++++++-----
> fs/coredump.c | 2 +-
> fs/inode.c | 11 +-
> fs/internal.h | 1 +
> fs/locks.c | 7 +-
> fs/namei.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> fs/remap_range.c | 20 ++--
> include/linux/fs.h | 6 +-
> 9 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst
> index 4f13b01e42eb..5acbad3be4fd 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst
> @@ -495,6 +495,9 @@ As of kernel 2.6.22, the following members are defined:
> struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa);
> int (*fileattr_get)(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa);
> struct offset_ctx *(*get_offset_ctx)(struct inode *inode);
> + int (*is_owned_by_me)(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode);
> + int (*have_same_owner)(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
> + struct dentry *dentry);
> };
>
> Again, all methods are called without any locks being held, unless
> @@ -679,6 +682,24 @@ otherwise noted.
> filesystem must define this operation to use
> simple_offset_dir_operations.
>
> +``is_owned_by_me``
> + called to determine if the file can be considered to be 'owned' by
> + the owner of the process or if the process has a token that grants
> + it ownership privileges. If unset, the default is to compare i_uid
> + to current_fsuid() - but this may give incorrect results for some
> + network or plug-in block filesystems. For example, AFS determines
> + ownership entirely according to an obtained token and i_uid may not
> + even be from the same ID space as current_uid().
> +
> +``have_same_owner``
> + called to determine if an inode has the same owner as its immediate
> + parent on the path walked. If unset, the default is to simply
> + compare the i_uid of both. For example, AFS compares the owner IDs
> + of both - but these are a 64-bit values on some variants that might
> + not fit into a kuid_t and cifs has GUIDs that cannot be compared to
> + kuid_t.
> +
> +
> The Address Space Object
> ========================
>
> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> index 795f231d00e8..096401a4815d 100644
> --- a/fs/attr.c
> +++ b/fs/attr.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/fcntl.h>
> #include <linux/filelock.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> +#include "internal.h"
>
> /**
> * setattr_should_drop_sgid - determine whether the setgid bit needs to be
> @@ -91,19 +92,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_should_drop_suidgid);
> * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
> * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
> */
> -static bool chown_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - const struct inode *inode, vfsuid_t ia_vfsuid)
> +static int chown_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> + struct inode *inode, vfsuid_t ia_vfsuid)
> {
> vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()) &&
> - vfsuid_eq(ia_vfsuid, vfsuid))
> - return true;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
> if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> - return true;
> + return 0;
> if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid) &&
> ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
> - return true;
> - return false;
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -118,23 +121,27 @@ static bool chown_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
> * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
> */
> -static bool chgrp_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - const struct inode *inode, vfsgid_t ia_vfsgid)
> +static int chgrp_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> + struct inode *inode, vfsgid_t ia_vfsgid)
> {
> vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode);
> - vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) {
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + if (ret == 0) {
> if (vfsgid_eq(ia_vfsgid, vfsgid))
> - return true;
> + return 0;
> if (vfsgid_in_group_p(ia_vfsgid))
> - return true;
> + return 0;
> }
> if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> - return true;
> + return 0;
> if (!vfsgid_valid(vfsgid) &&
> ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
> - return true;
> - return false;
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -163,6 +170,7 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> {
> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
> unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
> + int ret;
>
> /*
> * First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
> @@ -179,14 +187,18 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> goto kill_priv;
>
> /* Make sure a caller can chown. */
> - if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
> - !chown_ok(idmap, inode, attr->ia_vfsuid))
> - return -EPERM;
> + if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID) {
> + ret = chown_ok(idmap, inode, attr->ia_vfsuid);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + }
>
> /* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
> - if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
> - !chgrp_ok(idmap, inode, attr->ia_vfsgid))
> - return -EPERM;
> + if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID) {
> + ret = chgrp_ok(idmap, inode, attr->ia_vfsgid);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + }
>
> /* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
> if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
> diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> index b5fc06a092a4..ac113e41d090 100644
> --- a/fs/coredump.c
> +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> @@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ static bool coredump_file(struct core_name *cn, struct coredump_params *cprm,
> * filesystem.
> */
> idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
> - if (!vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), current_fsuid())) {
> + if (vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode) != 0) {
> coredump_report_failure("Core dump to %s aborted: cannot preserve file owner", cn->corename);
> return false;
> }
> diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
> index ec9339024ac3..61e6b1d71e86 100644
> --- a/fs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/inode.c
> @@ -2628,16 +2628,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
> * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
> * raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
> */
> -bool inode_owner_or_capable(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - const struct inode *inode)
> +bool inode_owner_or_capable(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
> {
> vfsuid_t vfsuid;
> struct user_namespace *ns;
> + int ret;
>
> - vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret == 0)
> return true;
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return false;
>
> + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
> ns = current_user_ns();
> if (vfsuid_has_mapping(ns, vfsuid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
> return true;
> diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
> index 9b2b4d116880..29682c6edecd 100644
> --- a/fs/internal.h
> +++ b/fs/internal.h
> @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ extern int finish_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc);
> /*
> * namei.c
> */
> +int vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode);
> extern int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
> struct path *path, const struct path *root);
> int do_rmdir(int dfd, struct filename *name);
> diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
> index 04a3f0e20724..b710bf0733b0 100644
> --- a/fs/locks.c
> +++ b/fs/locks.c
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
> #include <trace/events/filelock.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include "internal.h"
>
> static struct file_lock *file_lock(struct file_lock_core *flc)
> {
> @@ -2013,10 +2014,12 @@ int
> vfs_setlease(struct file *filp, int arg, struct file_lease **lease, void **priv)
> {
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
> - vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_idmap(filp), inode);
> int error;
>
> - if ((!vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) && !capable(CAP_LEASE))
> + error = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(file_mnt_idmap(filp), inode);
> + if (error < 0)
> + return error;
> + if (error != 0 && !capable(CAP_LEASE))
> return -EACCES;
> if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
> return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 7377020a2cba..7dbcb5d50339 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
> * The new code replaces the old recursive symlink resolution with
> * an iterative one (in case of non-nested symlink chains). It does
> * this with calls to <fs>_follow_link().
> - * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now
> - * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all
> + * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now
> + * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all
> * the special cases of the former code.
> *
> * With the new dcache, the pathname is stored at each inode, at least as
> @@ -1149,6 +1149,72 @@ fs_initcall(init_fs_namei_sysctls);
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
>
> +/*
> + * Determine if an inode is owned by the process (allowing for fsuid override),
> + * returning 0 if so, 1 if not and a negative error code if there was a problem
> + * making the determination.
> + */
> +int vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(inode->i_op->is_owned_by_me))
> + return inode->i_op->is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
Similar to IOP_FASTPERM this should use a flag to avoid pointer derefs.
> + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), current_fsuid()))
> + return 0;
> + return 1; /* Not same. */
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Determine if an inode has the same owner as its parent, returning 0 if so, 1
> + * if not and a negative error code if there was a problem making the
> + * determination.
> + */
> +static int vfs_inode_and_dir_have_same_owner(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
> + const struct nameidata *nd)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(inode->i_op->have_same_owner)) {
Same, as above: similar to IOP_FASTPERM this should use a flag to avoid pointer derefs.
Really, we should very properly bias this towards the common case where
the filesystem will not have a custom ownership comparison callback at all.
> + struct dentry *parent;
> + struct inode *dir;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (inode != nd->inode) {
> + dir = nd->inode;
> + ret = inode->i_op->have_same_owner(idmap, inode, dir);
> + } else if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
> + parent = READ_ONCE(nd->path.dentry);
> + dir = READ_ONCE(parent->d_inode);
> + if (!dir)
> + return -ECHILD;
> + ret = inode->i_op->have_same_owner(idmap, inode, dir);
> + } else {
> + parent = dget_parent(nd->path.dentry);
> + dir = parent->d_inode;
> + ret = inode->i_op->have_same_owner(idmap, inode, dir);
> + dput(parent);
> + }
> + return ret;
> + }
This about as ugly as it can get and costly...
> +
> + if (vfsuid_valid(nd->dir_vfsuid) &&
> + vfsuid_eq(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), nd->dir_vfsuid))
> + return 0;
> + return 1; /* Not same. */
Why is this returning 1? This will cause may_follow_link() to return 1
and that will bubble up as an error code? So shouldn't this return a
negative error code instead?
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Determine if two inodes have the same owner, returning 0 if so, 1 if not and
> + * a negative error code if there was a problem making the determination.
> + */
> +static int vfs_inodes_have_same_owner(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
> + struct inode *dir)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(inode->i_op->have_same_owner))
> + return inode->i_op->have_same_owner(idmap, inode, dir);
> + if (vfsuid_eq(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode),
> + i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, dir)))
> + return 0;
> + return 1; /* Not same. */
> +}
> +
> /**
> * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
> * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
> @@ -1165,27 +1231,28 @@ fs_initcall(init_fs_namei_sysctls);
> *
> * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error.
> */
> -static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inode)
> +static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *inode)
> {
> struct mnt_idmap *idmap;
> - vfsuid_t vfsuid;
> + int ret;
>
> if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks)
> return 0;
>
> - idmap = mnt_idmap(nd->path.mnt);
> - vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
> - /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))
> - return 0;
> -
> /* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
> if ((nd->dir_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) != (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH))
> return 0;
>
> + idmap = mnt_idmap(nd->path.mnt);
> + /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
> - if (vfsuid_valid(nd->dir_vfsuid) && vfsuid_eq(nd->dir_vfsuid, vfsuid))
> - return 0;
> + ret = vfs_inode_and_dir_have_same_owner(idmap, inode, nd);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
Ok, so while that doesn't exactly surface the error it's still weird.
Please make that consistent. Either have those two new helper functions
return negative error codes and zero on success or have it be a proper
boolean instead so there's no possible confusion. This is just begging
for someone to do if (ret) return ret and bubble up that positive return
value.
>
> if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
> return -ECHILD;
> @@ -1283,12 +1350,12 @@ int may_linkat(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *link)
> * @inode: the inode of the file to open
> *
> * Block an O_CREAT open of a FIFO (or a regular file) when:
> - * - sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is enabled
> - * - the file already exists
> - * - we are in a sticky directory
> - * - we don't own the file
> + * - sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is enabled,
> + * - the file already exists,
> + * - we are in a sticky directory,
> + * - the directory is world writable,
> + * - we don't own the file and
> * - the owner of the directory doesn't own the file
> - * - the directory is world writable
> * If the sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is set to 2
> * the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will
> * be enough.
> @@ -1299,13 +1366,45 @@ int may_linkat(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *link)
> * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
> * raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
> *
> + * For a filesystem (e.g. a network filesystem) that has a separate ID space
> + * and has foreign IDs (maybe even non-integer IDs), i_uid cannot be compared
> + * to current_fsuid() and may not be directly comparable to another i_uid.
> + * Instead, the filesystem is asked to perform the comparisons. With network
> + * filesystems, there also exists the possibility of doing anonymous
> + * operations and having anonymously-owned objects.
> + *
> + * We have the following scenarios:
> + *
> + * USER DIR FILE FILE ALLOWED
> + * OWNER OWNER STATE
> + * ======= ======= ======= ======= =======
> + * A A - New Yes
> + * A A A Exists Yes
> + * A A C Exists No
> + * A B - New Yes
> + * A B A Exists Yes, FO==U
> + * A B B Exists Yes, FO==DO
> + * A B C Exists No
> + * A anon[1] - New Yes
> + * A anon[1] A Exists Yes
> + * A anon[1] C Exists No
> + * anon A - New Yes
> + * anon A A Exists Yes, FO==DO
> + * anon anon[1] - New Yes
> + * anon anon[1] - Exists No
> + * anon A A Exists Yes, FO==DO
> + * anon A C Exists No
> + * anon A anon Exists No
> + *
> + * [1] Can anonymously-owned dirs be sticky?
> + *
> * Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error.
> */
> static int may_create_in_sticky(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct nameidata *nd,
> - struct inode *const inode)
> + struct inode *inode)
> {
> umode_t dir_mode = nd->dir_mode;
> - vfsuid_t dir_vfsuid = nd->dir_vfsuid, i_vfsuid;
> + int ret;
>
> if (likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)))
> return 0;
> @@ -1316,13 +1415,13 @@ static int may_create_in_sticky(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct nameidata *nd,
> if (S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) && !sysctl_protected_fifos)
> return 0;
>
> - i_vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
> -
> - if (vfsuid_eq(i_vfsuid, dir_vfsuid))
> - return 0;
> + ret = vfs_inode_and_dir_have_same_owner(idmap, inode, nd);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
>
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_vfsuid, current_fsuid()))
> - return 0;
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
>
> if (likely(dir_mode & 0002)) {
> audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_CREAT, "sticky_create");
> @@ -3222,12 +3321,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_at);
> int __check_sticky(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
> struct inode *inode)
> {
> - kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
> + int ret;
>
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), fsuid))
> - return 0;
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, dir), fsuid))
> - return 0;
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
> + ret = vfs_inodes_have_same_owner(idmap, inode, dir);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
> return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
> diff --git a/fs/remap_range.c b/fs/remap_range.c
> index 26afbbbfb10c..9eee93c27001 100644
> --- a/fs/remap_range.c
> +++ b/fs/remap_range.c
> @@ -413,20 +413,22 @@ loff_t vfs_clone_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_clone_file_range);
>
> /* Check whether we are allowed to dedupe the destination file */
> -static bool may_dedupe_file(struct file *file)
> +static int may_dedupe_file(struct file *file)
> {
> struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + int ret;
>
> if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> - return true;
> + return 0;
> if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> - return true;
> - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), current_fsuid()))
> - return true;
> + return 0;
> + ret = vfs_inode_is_owned_by_me(idmap, inode);
> + if (ret <= 0)
> + return ret;
> if (!inode_permission(idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE))
> - return true;
> - return false;
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> }
>
> loff_t vfs_dedupe_file_range_one(struct file *src_file, loff_t src_pos,
> @@ -459,8 +461,8 @@ loff_t vfs_dedupe_file_range_one(struct file *src_file, loff_t src_pos,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - ret = -EPERM;
> - if (!may_dedupe_file(dst_file))
> + ret = may_dedupe_file(dst_file);
> + if (ret < 0)
> goto out_drop_write;
>
> ret = -EXDEV;
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index c895146c1444..f59a7456852f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -2104,8 +2104,7 @@ static inline bool sb_start_intwrite_trylock(struct super_block *sb)
> return __sb_start_write_trylock(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
> }
>
> -bool inode_owner_or_capable(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - const struct inode *inode);
> +bool inode_owner_or_capable(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode);
>
> /*
> * VFS helper functions..
> @@ -2376,6 +2375,9 @@ struct inode_operations {
> struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa);
> int (*fileattr_get)(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa);
> struct offset_ctx *(*get_offset_ctx)(struct inode *inode);
> + int (*is_owned_by_me)(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode);
> + int (*have_same_owner)(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode1,
> + struct inode *inode2);
> } ____cacheline_aligned;
>
> /* Did the driver provide valid mmap hook configuration? */
>
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