linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v10 03/15] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives

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Message-ID: <34d91e30-9a94-4bbb-9a57-3679afbede2e@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 12:49:42 -0700
From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
CC: <x86@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "Thomas
 Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "Jonathan
 Corbet" <corbet@....net>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski
	<luto@...nel.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra
	<peterz@...radead.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, "Kirill A .
 Shutemov" <kas@...nel.org>, Xin Li <xin@...or.com>, David Woodhouse
	<dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Rick Edgecombe
	<rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>, David Laight
	<david.laight.linux@...il.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, "Geert
 Uytterhoeven" <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, Tony Luck
	<tony.luck@...el.com>, Alexander Shishkin
	<alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>, <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/15] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching
 kernel alternatives

On 10/22/2025 2:56 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 01:55:51PM -0700, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> In the series, we directly write to the CR4 bits, so they don't have any
>> wrappers. But in the future, lass_enable()/lass_disable() could be
>> confusing if wrappers were added for the CR4 toggling.
> 
> Are you envisioning to export the CR4.LASS toggling to users like those two or
> is former going to be done only at those two places?
> 
> Because CR4 toggling is expensive so you probably don't want to do that very
> often.
> 

I agree. My expectation is that those won't grow much beyond the
existing ones.

My understanding from your discussion with PeterZ is that we would use
lass_enable()/_disable() with the LASS alternatives but leave the
existing stac()/clac() as-is.

Below is the updated patch with the rename and the text to clarify usages.

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
index 4f84d421d1cf..4f4a4e0efff5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
@@ -23,18 +23,52 @@

 #else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */

+/*
+ * The CLAC/STAC instructions toggle the enforcement of
+ * X86_FEATURE_SMAP along with X86_FEATURE_LASS.
+ *
+ * SMAP enforcement is based on the _PAGE_BIT_USER bit in the page
+ * tables. The kernel is not allowed to touch pages with the bit set
+ * unless the AC bit is set.
+ *
+ * Use stac()/clac() when accessing userspace (_PAGE_USER) mappings,
+ * regardless of location.
+ *
+ * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
+ */
+
 static __always_inline void clac(void)
 {
-	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
 	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 }

 static __always_inline void stac(void)
 {
-	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
 	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 }

+/*
+ * LASS enforcement is based on bit 63 of the virtual address. The
+ * kernel is not allowed to touch memory in the lower half of the
+ * virtual address space unless the AC bit is set.
+ *
+ * Use lass_disable()/lass_enable() when accessing kernel (!_PAGE_USER)
+ * mappings in the lower half of the address space that are blocked by
+ * LASS, but not by SMAP.
+ *
+ * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
+ */
+
+static __always_inline void lass_enable(void)
+{
+	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void lass_disable(void)
+{
+	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+}
+
 static __always_inline unsigned long smap_save(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 8ee5ff547357..b38dbf08d5cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -2469,16 +2469,30 @@ void __init_or_module text_poke_early(void
*addr, const void *opcode,
 __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *text_poke_mm;
 __ro_after_init unsigned long text_poke_mm_addr;

+/*
+ * Text poking creates and uses a mapping in the lower half of the
+ * address space. Relax LASS enforcement when accessing the poking
+ * address.
+ *
+ * objtool enforces a strict policy of "no function calls within AC=1
+ * regions". Adhere to the policy by using inline versions of
+ * memcpy()/memset() that will never result in a function call.
+ */
+
 static void text_poke_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
 {
-	memcpy(dst, src, len);
+	lass_disable();
+	__inline_memcpy(dst, src, len);
+	lass_enable();
 }

 static void text_poke_memset(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
 {
 	int c = *(const int *)src;

-	memset(dst, c, len);
+	lass_disable();
+	__inline_memset(dst, c, len);
+	lass_enable();
 }

 typedef void text_poke_f(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len);