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Message-ID: <CAKYAXd-v9r0kKU9wO1ZZAtFju4H+OsG8RA3iYd15=eR6d5VEaQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 08:13:33 +0900
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...nel.org>
To: くさあさ <pioooooooooip@...il.com>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@...il.com>, Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>,
Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com>, linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ksmbd: transport_ipc: validate payload size before
reading handle
On Wed, Oct 22, 2025 at 7:45 PM くさあさ <pioooooooooip@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Namjae, Steve,
Hi,
>
> Thanks for updating the patch. I’ve reviewed the changes and they look good to me.
Okay.
>
> Minor impact note: this patch prevents a 4-byte out-of-bounds read in ksmbd’s handle_response() when the declared Generic Netlink payload size is < 4.
> If a remote client can influence ksmbd.mountd to emit a truncated payload, this could be remotely triggerable (info-leak/DoS potential).
I don't understand how this is possible. Could you please explain it
to me via private email?
> If you consider this security-impacting, I’m happy to request a CVE via the kernel.org CNA.
>
> Thanks!!
> Qianchang Zhao
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