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Message-ID: <CA+fCnZezciDNL4-Yto8d3bPOc3U07hY1Q_DMk926-1H17Ugx3Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2025 03:35:38 +0200
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
To: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@...cle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, 
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>, 
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>, Feng Tang <feng.79.tang@...il.com>, 
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...two.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, 
	stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/slab: ensure all metadata in slab object are word-aligned

On Fri, Oct 24, 2025 at 3:19 AM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2025 at 2:41 AM Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@...cle.com> wrote:
> >
> > Adding more details on how I discovered this and why I care:
> >
> > I was developing a feature that uses unused bytes in s->size as the
> > slabobj_ext metadata. Unlike other metadata where slab disables KASAN
> > when accessing it, this should be unpoisoned to avoid adding complexity
> > and overhead when accessing it.
>
> Generally, unpoisoining parts of slabs that should not be accessed by
> non-slab code is undesirable - this would prevent KASAN from detecting
> OOB accesses into that memory.
>
> An alternative to unpoisoning or disabling KASAN could be to add
> helper functions annotated with __no_sanitize_address that do the
> required accesses. And make them inlined when KASAN is disabled to
> avoid the performance hit.
>
> On a side note, you might also need to check whether SW_TAGS KASAN and

*HW_TAGS KASAN

SW_TAGS KASAN works with kasan_disable_current().

HW_TAGS KASAN does not and instead relies on the pointer tag being
reset for the access to be unchecked.

On another side note, unpoisoning slabobj_ext memory with either of
the TAGS modes would require it to be aligned to 16 bytes, not just 8.
(But those modes do not embed metadata after each object in a slab, so
your patch seems fine to me.)

> KMSAN would be unhappy with your changes:
>
> - When we do kasan_disable_current() or metadata_access_enable(), we
> also do kasan_reset_tag();
> - In metadata_access_enable(), we disable KMSAN as well.
>
> > This warning is from kasan_unpoison():
> >         if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
> >                 return;
> >
> > on x86_64, the address passed to kasan_{poison,unpoison}() should be at
> > least aligned with 8 bytes.
> >
> > After manual investigation it turns out when the SLAB_STORE_USER flag is
> > specified, any metadata after the original kmalloc request size is
> > misaligned.
> >
> > Questions:
> > - Could it cause any issues other than the one described above?
> > - Does KASAN even support architectures that have issues with unaligned
> >   accesses?
>
> Unaligned accesses are handled just fine. It's just that the start of
> any unpoisoned/accessible memory region must be aligned to 8 (or 16
> for SW_TAGS) bytes due to how KASAN encodes shadow memory values.
>
> > - How come we haven't seen any issues regarding this so far? :/
>
> As you pointed out, we don't unpoison the memory that stores KASAN
> metadata and instead just disable KASAN error reporting. This is done
> deliberately to allow KASAN catching accesses into that memory that
> happen outside of the slab/KASAN code.

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