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Message-ID: <20251029-verw-vm-v1-1-babf9b961519@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 14:26:26 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@...el.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well
TSA mitigation:
d8010d4ba43e ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")
introduced VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS for guests on AMD CPUs. Currently on Intel
CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is being used for guests which has a much broader scope
(kernel->user also).
Make mitigations on Intel consistent with TSA. This would help handling the
guest-only mitigations better in future.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 9 +++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d7fa03bf51b4517c12cc68e7c441f7589a4983d1..6d00a9ea7b4f28da291114a7a096b26cc129b57e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
/*
* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before VMenter. This is a subset of
- * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
+ * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
* mitigation is required.
*/
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
(mds_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void)
* present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
if (taa_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON)
cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -752,6 +754,7 @@ static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void)
} else {
static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
}
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
/*
* If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
@@ -839,8 +842,10 @@ static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void)
static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void)
{
- if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW)
+ if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
+ }
}
static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index bc255d709d8a16ae22b5bc401965d209a89a8692..0dd23beae207795484150698d1674dc4044cc520 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
- CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+ VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+.Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers:
/* Check EFLAGS.CF from the VMX_RUN_VMRESUME bit test above. */
jnc .Lvmlaunch
--
2.34.1
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