linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature verification

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Message-ID: <1fb245a0e72a360df3a768726351e7fa76301471.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 12:50:48 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        Dmitry Torokhov
 <dmitry.torokhov@...il.com>,
        Karel Srot <ksrot@...hat.com>,
        Roberto Sassu
 <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin	 <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn"	 <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"	 <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        open list	 <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature
 verification

On Thu, 2025-10-30 at 21:42 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> > > 
> > > Another question is whether we should allow loading a kernel module with
> > > appended signature but misses IMA signature. Both IMA arch specific policy
> > > and init_module syscall only require appended signature verification. On
> > > the other hand, we only allow "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" but not
> > > appraise_type=modsig. How about we allow loading a kernel module with
> > > valid appended signature regardless of its IMA signature? We won't call
> > > set_module_sig_enforced but as long as we know is_module_sig_enforced()
> > > is true, we allow the module in IMA.
> > 
> > Based on the policy, IMA enforces signature verification. Only if
> > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, the IMA arch specific policy does not define an
> > IMA kernel module appraise rule. However, custom policies could still require
> > both types of signatures, not necessarily signed by the same entity.
> > 
> > The option "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" allows either an IMA signature OR an
> > appended signature.
> 
> Thanks for the clarification! If I understand you correctly, some users
> may want to enforce IMA signature verification and we should provide
> such flexibility. Then do you think it's a good idea to change the kernel
> module rule in ima_policy=secure_boot to 
> "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig" so
> ima_policy=secure_boot can also work for in-kernel decompressing
> modules?

Yes, that's fine.  Unlike the arch specific policy rules and the Kconfig
appraise rules, which persist after loading a custom policy, the builtin secure
boot rules do not persist.

Mimi