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Message-ID: <E95F62DC-0B5D-47ED-8B72-F619B45340C8@zytor.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 10:22:29 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        "david.laight.linux@...il.com" <david.laight.linux@...il.com>,
        "jpoimboe@...nel.org" <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kas@...nel.org>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>, Xin Li <xin@...or.com>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 08/15] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code

On October 30, 2025 9:58:02 AM PDT, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>
>
>On Tue, Oct 7, 2025, at 11:48 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 10/7/25 11:37, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
>>>>  	/*
>>>>  	 * No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
>>>>  	 * trap to a high address, which means that we're in 64-bit user code.
>>> I don't know. Is this as true any more? We are now sometimes guessing based on
>>> regs->ip of a #GP. What if the kernel accidentally tries to jump to the vsyscall
>>> address? Then we are reading the kernel stack and strange things. Maybe it's
>>> worth replacing the comment with a check? Feel free to call this paranoid.
>>
>> The first check in emulate_vsyscall() is:
>>
>>        /* Write faults or kernel-privilege faults never get fixed up. */
>>        if ((error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_USER)) != X86_PF_USER)
>>                return false;
>>
>> If the kernel jumped to the vsyscall page, it would end up there, return
>> false, and never reach the code near the "No point in checking CS" comment.
>>
>> Right? Or am I misunderstanding the scenario you're calling out?
>>
>> If I'm understanding it right, I'd be a bit reluctant to add a CS check
>> as well.
>
>IMO it should boil down to exactly the same thing as the current code for the #PF case and, for #GP, there are two logical conditions that we care about:
>
>1. Are we in user mode?
>
>2. Are we using a 64-bit CS such that vsyscall emulation makes sense.
>
>Now I'd be a tiny bit surprised if a CPU allows you to lretq or similar to a 32-bit CS with >2^63 RIP, but what do I know?  One could test this on a variety of machines, both Intel and AMD, to see what actually happens.
>
>But the kernel wraps all this up as user_64bit_mode(regs).  If user_64bit_mode(regs) is true and RIP points to a vsyscall, then ISTM there aren't a whole lot of options.  Somehow we're in user mode, either via an exit from kernel mode or via CALL/JMP/whatever from user mode, and RIP is pointing at the vsyscall page, and CS is such that, in the absence of LASS, we would execute the vsyscall.  I suppose the #GP could be from some other cause than a LASS violation, but that doesn't seem worth worrying about.
>
>So I think all that's needed is to update "[PATCH v10 10/15] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP" to check user_64bit_mode(regs) for the vsyscall case.  (As submitted, unless I missed something while composing the patches in my head, it's only checking user_mode(regs), and I think it's worth the single extra line of code to make the result a tiny bit more robust.)

user_64bit_mode() is a CS check :)

There is that one extra check for PARAVIRT_XXL that *could* be gotten rid of by making the PV code report its 64-bit selector and patching it into the test, but it is on the error path anyway...


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