linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature verification

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Message-ID: <wlc2cylowxiuvfvj2yizes364yr27i3um5xen7ilyd4t2i3xzx@uucsqesigr2l>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 15:58:11 +0800
From: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, 
	Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@...il.com>, Karel Srot <ksrot@...hat.com>, 
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, 
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, 
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, 
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Fall back to default kernel module signature
 verification

On Thu, Oct 30, 2025 at 12:50:48PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>On Thu, 2025-10-30 at 21:42 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
>> > >
>> > > Another question is whether we should allow loading a kernel module with
>> > > appended signature but misses IMA signature. Both IMA arch specific policy
>> > > and init_module syscall only require appended signature verification. On
>> > > the other hand, we only allow "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" but not
>> > > appraise_type=modsig. How about we allow loading a kernel module with
>> > > valid appended signature regardless of its IMA signature? We won't call
>> > > set_module_sig_enforced but as long as we know is_module_sig_enforced()
>> > > is true, we allow the module in IMA.
>> >
>> > Based on the policy, IMA enforces signature verification. Only if
>> > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, the IMA arch specific policy does not define an
>> > IMA kernel module appraise rule. However, custom policies could still require
>> > both types of signatures, not necessarily signed by the same entity.
>> >
>> > The option "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" allows either an IMA signature OR an
>> > appended signature.
>>
>> Thanks for the clarification! If I understand you correctly, some users
>> may want to enforce IMA signature verification and we should provide
>> such flexibility. Then do you think it's a good idea to change the kernel
>> module rule in ima_policy=secure_boot to
>> "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig" so
>> ima_policy=secure_boot can also work for in-kernel decompressing
>> modules?
>
>Yes, that's fine.  Unlike the arch specific policy rules and the Kconfig
>appraise rules, which persist after loading a custom policy, the builtin secure
>boot rules do not persist.

Thanks for the confirmation! v2 has been posted.

>
>Mimi
>
>

-- 
Best regards,
Coiby