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Message-ID: <DDZ03S9DS8TP.174VN17SHX6NH@google.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2025 10:51:44 +0000
From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, 
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, 
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: VMX: Handle MMIO Stale Data in VM-Enter
 assembly via ALTERNATIVES_2

On Fri Oct 31, 2025 at 9:44 PM UTC, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 31, 2025, Brendan Jackman wrote:
>> On Fri Oct 31, 2025 at 12:30 AM UTC, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> > Rework the handling of the MMIO Stale Data mitigation to clear CPU buffers
>> > immediately prior to VM-Enter, i.e. in the same location that KVM emits a
>> > VERW for unconditional (at runtime) clearing.  Co-locating the code and
>> > using a single ALTERNATIVES_2 makes it more obvious how VMX mitigates the
>> > various vulnerabilities.
>> >
>> > Deliberately order the alternatives as:
>> >
>> >  0. Do nothing
>> >  1. Clear if vCPU can access MMIO
>> >  2. Clear always
>> >
>> > since the last alternative wins in ALTERNATIVES_2(), i.e. so that KVM will
>> > honor the strictest mitigation (always clear CPU buffers) if multiple
>> > mitigations are selected.  E.g. even if the kernel chooses to mitigate
>> > MMIO Stale Data via X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO, some other mitigation
>> > may enable X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and that other thing needs to win.
>> >
>> > Note, decoupling the MMIO mitigation from the L1TF mitigation also fixes
>> > a mostly-benign flaw where KVM wouldn't do any clearing/flushing if the
>> > L1TF mitigation is configured to conditionally flush the L1D, and the MMIO
>> > mitigation but not any other "clear CPU buffers" mitigation is enabled.
>> > For that specific scenario, KVM would skip clearing CPU buffers for the
>> > MMIO mitigation even though the kernel requested a clear on every VM-Enter.
>> >
>> > Note #2, the flaw goes back to the introduction of the MDS mitigation.  The
>> > MDS mitigation was inadvertently fixed by commit 43fb862de8f6 ("KVM/VMX:
>> > Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation"), but previous kernels
>> > that flush CPU buffers in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit() are affected (though it's
>> > unlikely the flaw is meaningfully exploitable even older kernels).
>> >
>> > Fixes: 650b68a0622f ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active")
>> > Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
>> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>> > ---
>> >  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 14 +++++++++++++-
>> >  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 13 -------------
>> >  2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
>> > index 1f99a98a16a2..61a809790a58 100644
>> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
>> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
>> > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
>> >   * @regs:	unsigned long * (to guest registers)
>> >   * @flags:	VMX_RUN_VMRESUME:	use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
>> >   *		VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl
>> > + *		VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO: vCPU can access host MMIO
>> >   *
>> >   * Returns:
>> >   *	0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
>> > @@ -137,6 +138,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
>> >  	/* Load @regs to RAX. */
>> >  	mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
>> >  
>> > +	/* Stash "clear for MMIO" in EFLAGS.ZF (used below). */
>> > +	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",								\
>> > +		      __stringify(test $VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO, %ebx), 	\
>> > +		      X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO,					\
>> > +		      "", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
>> 
>> Ah, so this ALTERNATIVE_2 (instead of just an ALTERNATIVE that checks
>> CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO) is really about avoiding the flags needing to be
>> mutually exclusive?
>
> Yeah, more or less.  More specifically, I want to keep the X vs. Y logic in one
> place (well, two if you count both ALTERNATIVE_2 flows), so that in generaly,
> from KVM's perspective, the mitigations are handled as independent things.  E.g.
> even if CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM and CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO are mutually exclusive within
> the kernel (and it's not clear to me that that's 100% guaranteed), I want to
> limit how much of KVM assumes they are exclusive.  Partly to avoid "oops, we
> forgot to mitigate that thing you care about", partly so that reading code like
> the setting of VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO doesn't require understanding
> the relationship between CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM and CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO.

Yeah, this makes sense, if we can avoid creating any unnecessary
and awkward-to-enforce invariants that seems like a win.

>> if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO) && 
>>     !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM))
>> 	test $VMX_RUN_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO, %ebx
>> 
>> ... right? This is a good idea but I think it warrants a comment to
>> capture the intent, without having the commit message in short-term
>> memory I'd have struggled with this code, I think.
>> 
>> >  	/* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
>> >  	bt   $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT, %ebx
>> >  
>> > @@ -161,7 +168,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
>> >  	mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
>> >  
>> >  	/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
>> > -	VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
>> > +	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",							\
>> > +		      __stringify(jz .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers;			\
>> 
>> Maybe I'm just an asm noob 
>
> Nah, all of this is definitely playing on hard mode.  I'm just thankful we don't
> have to deal with the horrors of KVM doing all of this in inline asm.  :-D
>
>> I was very impressed by this trick of using CF and ZF together like this!)
>> but I think it's helpful to have the comment like the jnc has below, and
>> Pawan had in his version, to really make the test->jz dependency obvious,
>> since the two instructions are quite far apart.
>> 
>> 
>> > +				  CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ;			\
>> > +				  .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers:),			\
>> > +		      X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO,				\
>> > +		      __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS, X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
>> 
>> Sorry I'm really nitpicking but I think it's justified for asm
>> readability...
>> 
>> It's a bit unfortunate that one branch says
>> CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ and the other says __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS. With the
>> current code I think it would be more readable to jut have
>> __stringify(CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ) in the CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM case, then
>> you don't have to mentally expand the macro to see how the two branches
>> actually differ.
>
> No preference here (assuming I understand what you're asking).
>
> Is this better?
>
> 	/*
> 	 * Note, this sequence consumes *and* clobbers EFLAGS.ZF.  The MMIO
> 	 * mitigations uses ZF to track whether or not the vCPU has access to
> 	 * host MMIO (see above), and VERW (the instruction microcode hijacks
> 	 * to clear CPU buffers) writes ZF.
> 	 */
> 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",							\
> 		      __stringify(jz .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers;			\
> 				  CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ;			\
> 				  .Lskip_clear_cpu_buffers:),			\
> 		      X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_MMIO,				\
> 		      __stringify(CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SEQ), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM

Yep that looks good to me.

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