Message-ID: <c1dbe57e-e5fb-4ca7-8329-e245c03680af@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2025 08:41:24 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
 serge@...lyn.com, keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
 penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp, stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
 Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] LSM: Exclusive secmark usage


On 10/13/2025 2:57 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:56 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> The network secmark can only be used by one security module
>> at a time. Establish mechanism to identify to security modules
>> whether they have access to the secmark. SELinux already
>> incorparates mechanism, but it has to be added to Smack and
>> AppArmor.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h        |  1 +
>>  security/apparmor/include/net.h  |  5 +++++
>>  security/apparmor/lsm.c          |  7 ++++---
>>  security/security.c              |  6 ++++++
>>  security/selinux/hooks.c         |  4 +++-
>>  security/smack/smack.h           |  5 +++++
>>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c       |  3 ++-
>>  security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 10 ++++++++--
>>  8 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> ..
>
>>  /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index c95a5874bf7d..5b6db7d8effb 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
>>   */
>>  static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
>>  {
>> -       return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
>> +       return selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_secmark &&
>> +              (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
>>                 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
>>  }
> This is an odd way to approach secmark enablement in SELinux, and not
> something I think I want to see.  Ignoring the
> selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork "abomination" (a joke I think only
> about four people in the world might understand), the
> selinux_secmark_enabled() function is really there simply as a
> performance optimization since the majority of SELinux users don't
> utilize the per-packet access controls.  Using it as a mechanism to
> effectively turn off SELinux's secmark functionality could result in a
> confusing situation for users who are setting SELinux secmarks on
> packets and not seeing the system's policy properly enforced.

One could argue that a user who creates a system that would have this
problem has configured it incorrectly. A system with Smack before SELinux
( https://lwn.net/Articles/645245/ ) would, by the "first LSM gets it"
rule, give the secmark to Smack. If the user wants SELinux to use secmarks
SELinux must precede Smack. The SELinux policy, as well as the Smack rule
set, are going to have to be correct for the configuration, as are any
netfilter rules. Yes, that's likely to make some sysadmin's heads explode.
Complex configurations are admittedly difficult to get right. When you
start with a system that isn't simple and add to it you can help but run
into situations that are baffling.

You can create a correctly behaving system with the "first LSM" behavior.
You can also create a system that goes completely wonky. Just as you want
a well trained developer creating your SELinux policy, you want someone
who knows what they're doing composing LSM stacks.

This is going to be an issue for other features, including audit rules and IMA. 

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