linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] net: sched: act_ife: initialize struct tc

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Message-ID: <aQuh2czgE7wmTxbq@horms.kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2025 19:13:29 +0000
From: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
To: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>
Cc: Ranganath V N <vnranganath.20@...il.com>, davem@...emloft.net,
	david.hunter.linux@...il.com, edumazet@...gle.com, jiri@...nulli.us,
	khalid@...nel.org, kuba@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
	skhan@...uxfoundation.org,
	syzbot+0c85cae3350b7d486aee@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
	xiyou.wangcong@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] net: sched: act_ife: initialize struct tc_ife to
 fix KMSAN kernel-infoleak

On Wed, Nov 05, 2025 at 10:09:37AM -0500, Jamal Hadi Salim wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 7:59 AM Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 05, 2025 at 03:33:58PM +0530, Ranganath V N wrote:
> > > On 11/4/25 19:38, Simon Horman wrote:
> > > > On Sat, Nov 01, 2025 at 06:04:46PM +0530, Ranganath V N wrote:
> > > >> Fix a KMSAN kernel-infoleak detected  by the syzbot .
> > > >>
> > > >> [net?] KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in __skb_datagram_iter
> > > >>
> > > >> In tcf_ife_dump(), the variable 'opt' was partially initialized using a
> > > >> designatied initializer. While the padding bytes are reamined
> > > >> uninitialized. nla_put() copies the entire structure into a
> > > >> netlink message, these uninitialized bytes leaked to userspace.
> > > >>
> > > >> Initialize the structure with memset before assigning its fields
> > > >> to ensure all members and padding are cleared prior to beign copied.
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps not important, but this seems to only describe patch 1/2.
> > > >
> > > >>
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Ranganath V N <vnranganath.20@...il.com>
> > > >
> > > > Sorry for not looking more carefully at v1.
> > > >
> > > > The presence of this padding seems pretty subtle to me.
> > > > And while I agree that your change fixes the problem described.
> > > > I wonder if it would be better to make things more obvious
> > > > by adding a 2-byte pad member to the structures involved.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the input.
> > >
> > > One question — even though adding a 2-byte `pad` field silences KMSAN,
> > > would that approach be reliable across all architectures?
> > > Since the actual amount and placement of padding can vary depending on
> > > structure alignment and compiler behavior, I’m wondering if this would only
> > > silence the report on certain builds rather than fixing the root cause.
> > >
> > > The current memset-based initialization explicitly clears all bytes in the
> > > structure (including any compiler-inserted padding), which seems safer and
> > > more consistent across architectures.
> > >
> > > Also, adding a new member — even a padding field — could potentially alter
> > > the structure size or layout as seen from user space. That might
> > > unintentionally affect existing user-space expectations.
> > >
> > > Do you think relying on a manual pad field is good enough?
> >
> > I think these are the right questions to ask.
> >
> > My thinking is that structures will be padded to a multiple
> > of either 4 or 8 bytes, depending on the architecture.
> >
> > And my observation is that that the unpadded length of both of the structures
> > in question are 22 bytes. And that on x86_64 they are padded to 24 bytes.
> > Which is divisible by both 4 and 8. So I assume this will be consistent
> > for all architectures. If so, I think this would address the questions you
> > raised.
> >
> > I do, however, agree that your current memset-based approach is safer
> > in the sense that it carries a lower risk of breaking things because
> > it has fewer assumptions (that we have thought of so far).
> 
> +1
> My view is lets fix the immediate leak issue with the memset, and a
> subsequent patch can add the padding if necessary.

Sure, no objections from my side.