linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3] bpf: Clamp trace length in __bpf_get

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Message-ID: <3f79436c-d343-46ff-8559-afb7da24a44d@arnaud-lcm.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 08:40:34 +0000
From: "Lecomte, Arnaud" <contact@...aud-lcm.com>
To: Brahmajit Das <listout@...tout.xyz>,
 syzbot+d1b7fa1092def3628bd7@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: andrii@...nel.org, ast@...nel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
 daniel@...earbox.net, eddyz87@...il.com, haoluo@...gle.com,
 john.fastabend@...il.com, jolsa@...nel.org, kpsingh@...nel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, martin.lau@...ux.dev, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 sdf@...ichev.me, song@...nel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
 yonghong.song@...ux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3] bpf: Clamp trace length in __bpf_get_stack to
 fix OOB write

I am a not sure this is the right solution and I am scared that by
forcing this clamping, we are hiding something else.
If we have a look at the code below:
```

|

	if (trace_in) {
		trace = trace_in;
		trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
	} else if (kernel && task) {
		trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
	} else {
		trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, kernel, user, max_depth,
					crosstask, false, 0);
	} ``` trace should be (if I remember correctly) clamped there. If not, 
it might hide something else. I would like to have a look at the return 
for each if case through gdb. |

On 11/11/2025 08:12, Brahmajit Das wrote:
> syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds write in __bpf_get_stack()
> triggered via bpf_get_stack() when capturing a kernel stack trace.
>
> After the recent refactor that introduced stack_map_calculate_max_depth(),
> the code in stack_map_get_build_id_offset() (and related helpers) stopped
> clamping the number of trace entries (`trace_nr`) to the number of elements
> that fit into the stack map value (`num_elem`).
>
> As a result, if the captured stack contained more frames than the map value
> can hold, the subsequent memcpy() would write past the end of the buffer,
> triggering a KASAN report like:
>
>      BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __bpf_get_stack+0x...
>      Write of size N at addr ... by task syz-executor...
>
> Restore the missing clamp by limiting `trace_nr` to `num_elem` before
> computing the copy length. This mirrors the pre-refactor logic and ensures
> we never copy more bytes than the destination buffer can hold.
>
> No functional change intended beyond reintroducing the missing bound check.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+d1b7fa1092def3628bd7@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: e17d62fedd10 ("bpf: Refactor stack map trace depth calculation into helper function")
> Signed-off-by: Brahmajit Das <listout@...tout.xyz>
> ---
> Changes in v3:
> Revert back to num_elem based logic for setting trace_nr. This was
> suggested by bpf-ci bot, mainly pointing out the chances of underflow
> when  max_depth < skip.
>
> Quoting the bot's reply:
> The stack_map_calculate_max_depth() function can return a value less than
> skip when sysctl_perf_event_max_stack is lowered below the skip value:
>
>      max_depth = size / elem_size;
>      max_depth += skip;
>      if (max_depth > curr_sysctl_max_stack)
>          return curr_sysctl_max_stack;
>
> If sysctl_perf_event_max_stack = 10 and skip = 20, this returns 10.
>
> Then max_depth - skip = 10 - 20 underflows to 4294967286 (u32 wraps),
> causing min_t() to not limit trace_nr at all. This means the original OOB
> write is not fixed in cases where skip > max_depth.
>
> With the default sysctl_perf_event_max_stack = 127 and skip up to 255, this
> scenario is reachable even without admin changing sysctls.
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Use max_depth instead of num_elem logic, this logic is similar to what
> we are already using __bpf_get_stackid
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251111003721.7629-1-listout@listout.xyz/
>
> Changes in v1:
> - RFC patch that restores the number of trace entries by setting
> trace_nr to trace_nr or num_elem based on whichever is the smallest.
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251110211640.963-1-listout@listout.xyz/
> ---
>   kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 4 +++-
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
> index 2365541c81dd..cef79d9517ab 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
> @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
>   			    struct perf_callchain_entry *trace_in,
>   			    void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags, bool may_fault)
>   {
> -	u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, max_depth;
> +	u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, num_elem, max_depth;
>   	bool user_build_id = flags & BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID;
>   	bool crosstask = task && task != current;
>   	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
> @@ -480,6 +480,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
>   	}
>   
>   	trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
> +	num_elem = size / elem_size;
> +	trace_nr = min_t(u32, trace_nr, num_elem);
>   	copy_len = trace_nr * elem_size;
>   
>   	ips = trace->ip + skip;

Thanks,
Arnaud