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Message-ID: <aRegH8P4cPlzzlX9@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 15:33:19 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Ryan Foster <foster.ryan.r@...il.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] Clarify the rootid_owns_currentns
Split most of the rootid_owns_currentns() functionality
into a more generic rootid_owns_ns() function which
will be easier to write tests for.
Rename the functions and variables to make clear that
the ids being tested could be any uid.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
CC: Ryan Foster <foster.ryan.r@...il.com>
CC: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
---
security/commoncap.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 6bd4adeb4795..8a81fdc12cbe 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -358,17 +358,18 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
return error;
}
-static bool rootid_owns_currentns(vfsuid_t rootvfsuid)
+/**
+ * kuid_root_in_ns - check whether the given kuid is root in the given ns
+ *
+ * @kuid - the kuid to be tested
+ * @ns - the user namespace to test against
+ *
+ * Returns true if @kuid represents the root user in @ns, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool kuid_root_in_ns(kuid_t kuid, struct user_namespace *ns)
{
- struct user_namespace *ns;
- kuid_t kroot;
-
- if (!vfsuid_valid(rootvfsuid))
- return false;
-
- kroot = vfsuid_into_kuid(rootvfsuid);
- for (ns = current_user_ns();; ns = ns->parent) {
- if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
+ for (;; ns = ns->parent) {
+ if (from_kuid(ns, kuid) == 0)
return true;
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
break;
@@ -377,6 +378,16 @@ static bool rootid_owns_currentns(vfsuid_t rootvfsuid)
return false;
}
+static bool vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsuid_t vfsuid)
+{
+ kuid_t kuid;
+
+ if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid))
+ return false;
+ kuid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+ return kuid_root_in_ns(kuid, current_user_ns());
+}
+
static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
{
return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
@@ -481,7 +492,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
goto out_free;
}
- if (!rootid_owns_currentns(vfsroot)) {
+ if (!vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsroot)) {
size = -EOVERFLOW;
goto out_free;
}
@@ -722,7 +733,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
/* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
* or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
*/
- if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootvfsuid))
+ if (!vfsuid_root_in_currentns(rootvfsuid))
return -ENODATA;
cpu_caps->permitted.val = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[0].permitted);
--
2.34.1
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