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Message-ID: <20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-8-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 22:19:36 -0800
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 08/11] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush
Adding more mitigation options at exit-to-userspace for VMSCAPE would
usually require a series of checks to decide which mitigation to use. In
this case, the mitigation is done by calling a function, which is decided
at boot. So, adding more feature flags and multiple checks can be avoided
by using static_call() to the mitigating function.
Replace the flag-based mitigation selector with a static_call(). This also
frees the existing X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER.
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 +++----
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index fa3b616af03a2d50eaf5f922bc8cd4e08a284045..066f62f15e67e85fda0f3fd66acabad9a9794ff8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2706,6 +2706,7 @@ config MITIGATION_TSA
config MITIGATION_VMSCAPE
bool "Mitigate VMSCAPE"
depends on KVM
+ select HAVE_STATIC_CALL
default y
help
Enable mitigation for VMSCAPE attacks. VMSCAPE is a hardware security
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 4091a776e37aaed67ca93b0a0cd23cc25dbc33d4..02871318c999f94ec8557e5fb0b8fb299960d454 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO (21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO (21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM (21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER (21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */
+/* Free */
#define X86_FEATURE_ABMC (21*32+15) /* Assignable Bandwidth Monitoring Counters */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM (21*32+16) /* MSR immediate form instructions */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 78b143673ca72642149eb2dbf3e3e31370fe6b28..783e7cb50caeb6c6fc68e0a5c75ab43e75e37116 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/static_call_types.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
@@ -94,10 +95,8 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
*/
choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
- /* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user' */
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
- this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user)) {
- write_ibpb();
+ if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user))) {
+ static_call_cond(vmscape_predictor_flush)();
this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, false);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index df60f9cf51b84e5b75e5db70713188d2e6ad0f5d..15a2fa8f2f48a066e102263513eff9537ac1d25f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
:: "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "memory");
}
+#include <linux/static_call_types.h>
+DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 233594ede19bf971c999f4d3cc0f6f213002c16c..cbb3341b9a19f835738eda7226323d88b7e41e52 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -200,6 +200,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+EXPORT_STATIC_CALL_GPL(vmscape_predictor_flush);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "mitigations: " fmt
@@ -3274,7 +3277,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void)
static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void)
{
if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER);
+ static_call_update(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
}
#undef pr_fmt
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 60123568fba85c8a445f9220d3f4a1d11fd0eb77..7e55ef3b3203a26be1a138c8fa838a8c5aae0125 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11396,7 +11396,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* set for the CPU that actually ran the guest, and not the CPU that it
* may migrate to.
*/
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER))
+ if (static_call_query(vmscape_predictor_flush))
this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, true);
/*
--
2.34.1
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