Message-ID:
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Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 12:26:48 +0100
From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
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Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] exec: Move cred computation under exec_update_lock

On 11/21/25 10:35, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> On 11/21/25 08:18, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de> writes:
>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> thanks for you valuable input on the topic.
>>>
>>> On 11/21/25 00:50, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>> "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Instead of computing the new cred before we pass the point of no
>>>>> return compute the new cred just before we use it.
>>>>>
>>>>> This allows the removal of fs_struct->in_exec and cred_guard_mutex.
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not certain why we wanted to compute the cred for the new
>>>>> executable so early.  Perhaps I missed something but I did not see any
>>>>> common errors being signaled.   So I don't think we loose anything by
>>>>> computing the new cred later.
>>>>
>>>> I should add that the permission checks happen in open_exec,
>>>> everything that follows credential wise is just about representing in
>>>> struct cred the credentials the new executable will have.
>>>>
>>>> So I am really at a loss why we have had this complicated way of
>>>> computing of computed the credentials all of these years full of
>>>> time of check to time of use problems.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Well, I think I see a problem with your patch:
>>>
>>> When the security engine gets the LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE flag, it might
>>> e.g. return -EPERM in bprm_creds_for_exec in the apparmor, selinux
>>> or the smack security engines at least.  Previously that callback
>>> was called before the point of no return, and the return code should
>>> be returned as a return code the the caller of execve.  But if we move
>>> that check after the point of no return, the caller will get killed
>>> due to the failed security check.
>>>
>>> Or did I miss something?
>>
>> I think we definitely need to document this change in behavior.  I would
>> call ending the exec with SIGSEGV vs -EPERM a quality of implementation
>> issue.  The exec is failing one way or the other so I don't see it as a
>> correctness issue.
>>
>> In the case of ptrace in general I think it is a bug if the mere act of
>> debugging a program changes it's behavior.  So which buggy behavior
>> should we prefer?  SIGSEGV where it is totally clear that the behavior
>> has changed or -EPERM and ask the debugged program to handle it.
>> I lean towards SIGSEGV because then it is clear the code should not
>> handle it.
>>
>> In the case of LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS I believe the preferred way to
>> handle unexpected things happening is to terminate the application.
>>
>> In the case of LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE -EPERM might be better.  I don't know
>> of any good uses of any good uses of sys_clone(CLONE_FS ...) outside
>> of CLONE_THREAD.
>>
>>
>> Plus all of these things are only considerations if we are exec'ing a
>> program that transitions to a different set of credentials.  Something
>> that happens but is quite rare itself.
>>
>> In practice I don't expect there is anything that depends on the exact
>> behavior of what happens when exec'ing a suid executable to gain
>> privileges when ptraced.   The closes I can imagine is upstart and
>> I think upstart ran as root when ptracing other programs so there is no
>> gaining of privilege and thus no reason for a security module to
>> complain.
>>
>> Who knows I could be wrong, and someone could actually care.  Which is
>> hy I think we should document it.>>
> 
> 
> Well, I dont know for sure, but the security engine could deny the execution
> for any reason, not only because of being ptraced.
> Maybe there can be a policy which denies user X to execute e.g. any suid programs.
> 
> 
> Bernd.
> 

Hmm, funny..

I installed this patch on top of

commit fd95357fd8c6778ac7dea6c57a19b8b182b6e91f (HEAD -> master, origin/master, origin/HEAD)
Merge: c966813ea120 7b6216baae75
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Date:   Thu Nov 20 11:04:37 2025 -0800

but it does panic when I try to boot:

[  0.870539]     TERM=1inux
[  0.870573] Starting init: /bin/sh exists but couldn't execute it (error -14) 0.8705751 Kernel panic- not syncing: No working init found. Try passing i mit= option to kernel. See Linux Documentation/admin-guide/init.rst for guidance
[  0.870577] CPU: UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  0.870579] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBo x 12/01/2006
[  0.870580] Call Trace:
[  0.870590]  <TASK>
[  0.870592]  vpanic+0x36d/0x380
[  0.870607]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  0.870615]  panic+0x5b/0x60
[  0.870617]  kernel_init+0x17d/0x1c0
[  0.870623]  ret_from_fork+0x124/0x150
[  0.870625}  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  0.870627]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  0.870632]  </TASK>
[  0.8706631 Kernel Offset: 0x3a800000 from Oxffffffff81000000 (relocation ran ge: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[  0.880034] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: No working init found. Try passing init option to kernel. See Linux Documentation/admin-guide/init.rst for guidance. 1---`


Is that a known problem?

Bernd.

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