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Message-ID: <CAHc6FU5ofV7s3Q4KBGFJ3gExwsMpbaZ9Vj0FEHqrOreqvQMswQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2025 08:46:29 +0100
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>
To: Stephen Zhang <starzhangzsd@...il.com>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-block@...r.kernel.org, nvdimm@...ts.linux.dev, 
	virtualization@...ts.linux.dev, linux-nvme@...ts.infradead.org, 
	gfs2@...ts.linux.dev, ntfs3@...ts.linux.dev, linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org, 
	zhangshida@...inos.cn
Subject: Re: Fix potential data loss and corruption due to Incorrect BIO Chain Handling

On Sat, Nov 22, 2025 at 7:52 AM Stephen Zhang <starzhangzsd@...il.com> wrote:
> Ming Lei <ming.lei@...hat.com> 于2025年11月22日周六 11:35写道:
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 21, 2025 at 04:17:39PM +0800, zhangshida wrote:
> > > From: Shida Zhang <zhangshida@...inos.cn>
> > >
> > > Hello everyone,
> > >
> > > We have recently encountered a severe data loss issue on kernel version 4.19,
> > > and we suspect the same underlying problem may exist in the latest kernel versions.
> > >
> > > Environment:
> > > *   **Architecture:** arm64
> > > *   **Page Size:** 64KB
> > > *   **Filesystem:** XFS with a 4KB block size
> > >
> > > Scenario:
> > > The issue occurs while running a MySQL instance where one thread appends data
> > > to a log file, and a separate thread concurrently reads that file to perform
> > > CRC checks on its contents.
> > >
> > > Problem Description:
> > > Occasionally, the reading thread detects data corruption. Specifically, it finds
> > > that stale data has been exposed in the middle of the file.
> > >
> > > We have captured four instances of this corruption in our production environment.
> > > In each case, we observed a distinct pattern:
> > >     The corruption starts at an offset that aligns with the beginning of an XFS extent.
> > >     The corruption ends at an offset that is aligned to the system's `PAGE_SIZE` (64KB in our case).
> > >
> > > Corruption Instances:
> > > 1.  Start:`0x73be000`, **End:** `0x73c0000` (Length: 8KB)
> > > 2.  Start:`0x10791a000`, **End:** `0x107920000` (Length: 24KB)
> > > 3.  Start:`0x14535a000`, **End:** `0x145b70000` (Length: 8280KB)
> > > 4.  Start:`0x370d000`, **End:** `0x3710000` (Length: 12KB)
> > >
> > > After analysis, we believe the root cause is in the handling of chained bios, specifically
> > > related to out-of-order io completion.
> > >
> > > Consider a bio chain where `bi_remaining` is decremented as each bio in the chain completes.
> > > For example,
> > > if a chain consists of three bios (bio1 -> bio2 -> bio3) with
> > > bi_remaining count:
> > > 1->2->2
> >
> > Right.
> >
> > > if the bio completes in the reverse order, there will be a problem.
> > > if bio 3 completes first, it will become:
> > > 1->2->1
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > > then bio 2 completes:
> > > 1->1->0

Currently, bio_chain_endio() will actually not decrement
__bi_remaining but it will call bio_put(bio 2) and bio_endio(parent),
which will lead to 1->2->0. And when bio 1 completes, bio 2 won't
exist anymore.

> > No, it is supposed to be 1->1->1.
> >
> > When bio 1 completes, it will become 0->0->0
> >
> > bio3's `__bi_remaining` won't drop to zero until bio2's reaches
> > zero, and bio2 won't be done until bio1 is ended.
> >
> > Please look at bio_endio():
> >
> > void bio_endio(struct bio *bio)
> > {
> > again:
> >         if (!bio_remaining_done(bio))
> >                 return;
> >         ...
> >         if (bio->bi_end_io == bio_chain_endio) {
> >                 bio = __bio_chain_endio(bio);
> >         goto again;
> >         }
> >         ...
> > }
> >
>
> Exactly, bio_endio handle the process perfectly, but it seems to forget
> to check if the very first  `__bi_remaining` drops to zero and proceeds to
> the next bio:
> -----
> static struct bio *__bio_chain_endio(struct bio *bio)
> {
>         struct bio *parent = bio->bi_private;
>
>         if (bio->bi_status && !parent->bi_status)
>                 parent->bi_status = bio->bi_status;
>         bio_put(bio);
>         return parent;
> }
>
> static void bio_chain_endio(struct bio *bio)
> {
>         bio_endio(__bio_chain_endio(bio));
> }
> ----

This bug could be fixed as follows:

 static void bio_chain_endio(struct bio *bio)
 {
+        if (!bio_remaining_done(bio))
+                return;
         bio_endio(__bio_chain_endio(bio));
 }

but bio_endio() already does all that, so bio_chain_endio() might just
as well just call bio_endio(bio) instead.

Thanks,
Andreas


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