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Message-ID: <xhsmh3462td2c.mognet@vschneid-thinkpadt14sgen2i.remote.csb>
Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 15:13:47 +0100
From: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@...hat.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, rcu@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, loongarch@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter
Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
<acme@...nel.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini
<pbonzini@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Frederic Weisbecker
<frederic@...nel.org>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, Jason
Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Ard
Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Neeraj Upadhyay
<neeraj.upadhyay@...nel.org>, Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@...dia.com>, Josh
Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>, Mathieu Desnoyers
<mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>, Andrew
Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Masahiro Yamada
<masahiroy@...nel.org>, Han Shen <shenhan@...gle.com>, Rik van Riel
<riel@...riel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Dan Carpenter
<dan.carpenter@...aro.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Juri Lelli
<juri.lelli@...hat.com>, Clark Williams <williams@...hat.com>, Yair
Podemsky <ypodemsk@...hat.com>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>,
Daniel Wagner <dwagner@...e.de>, Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@...e.com>,
Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 30/31] x86/mm, mm/vmalloc: Defer kernel TLB flush
IPIs under CONFIG_COALESCE_TLBI=y
On 21/11/25 09:50, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/21/25 09:37, Valentin Schneider wrote:
>> On 19/11/25 10:31, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> On 11/14/25 07:14, Valentin Schneider wrote:
>>>> +static bool flush_tlb_kernel_cond(int cpu, void *info)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return housekeeping_cpu(cpu, HK_TYPE_KERNEL_NOISE) ||
>>>> + per_cpu(kernel_cr3_loaded, cpu);
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> Is it OK that 'kernel_cr3_loaded' can be be stale? Since it's not part
>>> of the instruction that actually sets CR3, there's a window between when
>>> 'kernel_cr3_loaded' is set (or cleared) and CR3 is actually written.
>>>
>>> Is that OK?
>>>
>>> It seems like it could lead to both unnecessary IPIs being sent and for
>>> IPIs to be missed.
>>>
>>
>> So the pattern is
>>
>> SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
>> FLUSH
>> KERNEL_CR3_LOADED := 1
>>
>> KERNEL_CR3_LOADED := 0
>> SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3
>>
>>
>> The 0 -> 1 transition has a window between the unconditional flush and the
>> write to 1 where a remote flush IPI may be omitted. Given that the write is
>> immediately following the unconditional flush, that would really be just
>> two flushes racing with each other,
>
> Let me fix that for you. When you wrote "a remote flush IPI may be
> omitted" you meant to write: "there's a bug." ;)
>
Something like that :-)
> In the end, KERNEL_CR3_LOADED==0 means, "you don't need to send this CPU
> flushing IPIs because it will flush the TLB itself before touching
> memory that needs a flush".
>
> SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
> FLUSH
> // On kernel CR3, *AND* not getting IPIs
> KERNEL_CR3_LOADED := 1
>
>> but I could punt the kernel_cr3_loaded
>> write above the unconditional flush.
>
> Yes, that would eliminate the window, as long as the memory ordering is
> right. You not only need to have the KERNEL_CR3_LOADED:=1 CPU set that
> variable, you need to ensure that it has seen the page table update.
>
I assumed the page table update would be a self-synchronizing operation,
but that betrays how little I know about x86; /me goes back to reading
>> The 1 -> 0 transition is less problematic, worst case a remote flush races
>> with the CPU returning to userspace and it'll get interrupted back to
>> kernelspace.
>
> It's also not just "returning to userspace". It could well be *in*
> userspace by the point the IPI shows up. It's not the end of the world,
> and the window isn't infinitely long. But there certainly is still a
> possibility of getting spurious interrupts for the precious NOHZ_FULL
> task while it's in userspace.
IME it's okay if the application is just starting as it needs to do some
initialization anyway (mlockall & friends), i.e. it's not executing actual
useful payload from the get go.
If it's resuming from an interference, well we'd be making things worse.
I'm thinking the worst case is if this becomes a repeating pattern, but
then that means even without those deferral hacks the isolated CPUs would
be bombarded by IPIs in the first place.
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