| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <aSiOU7G1DEf-5-1a@earth.li>
Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2025 17:45:55 +0000
From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@...th.li>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, ross.philipson@...cle.com,
Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>,
Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 03/11] KEYS: trusted: remove redundant instance of
tpm2_hash_map
On Thu, Nov 27, 2025 at 03:54:35PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>Trusted keys duplicates tpm2_hash_map from TPM driver internals. Implement
>and export `tpm2_find_hash_alg()` in order to address this glitch, and
>replace redundant code block with a call this new function.
>
>Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
>---
>v7:
>- A new patch.
>---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++--
> include/linux/tpm.h | 7 ++-----
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 25 +++++------------------
> 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>index 97501c567c34..1393bfbeca64 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
>@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
> module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
> MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend");
>
>-static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
>+static struct {
>+ unsigned int crypto_id;
>+ unsigned int alg_id;
>+} tpm2_hash_map[] = {
> {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
> {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
> {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
>@@ -26,6 +29,18 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
> {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
> };
>
>+int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id)
>+{
>+ int i;
>+
>+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++)
>+ if (crypto_id == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id)
>+ return tpm2_hash_map[i].alg_id;
>+
>+ return -EINVAL;
>+}
>+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_find_hash_alg);
>+
> int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> {
> chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
>@@ -490,7 +505,7 @@ static int tpm2_init_bank_info(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 bank_index)
> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
> enum hash_algo crypto_algo = tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id;
>
>- if (bank->alg_id != tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id)
>+ if (bank->alg_id != tpm2_hash_map[i].alg_id)
> continue;
>
> bank->digest_size = hash_digest_size[crypto_algo];
>diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
>index 0e9e043f728c..e5fc7b73de2d 100644
>--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
>+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
>@@ -410,11 +410,6 @@ enum tpm2_session_attributes {
> TPM2_SA_AUDIT = BIT(7),
> };
>
>-struct tpm2_hash {
>- unsigned int crypto_id;
>- unsigned int tpm_id;
>-};
>-
> int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal);
> void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal);
> int tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf);
>@@ -465,6 +460,7 @@ static inline ssize_t tpm_ret_to_err(ssize_t ret)
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
>
>+unsigned int tpm2_alg_to_crypto_id(unsigned int alg_id);
> extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
This looks like an errant chunk? I can't see tpm2_alg_to_crypto_id
defined or used?
>@@ -477,6 +473,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max);
> extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void);
> void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
>+int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id);
>
> static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
> {
>diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>index 024be262702f..3205732fb4b7 100644
>--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
>
> #include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
>
>-static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
>- {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
>- {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
>- {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
>- {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
>- {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
>-};
>-
> static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
>
> static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>@@ -244,24 +236,17 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
> int blob_len = 0;
>- u32 hash;
>+ int hash;
> u32 flags;
>- int i;
> int rc;
>
>- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
>- if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
>- hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
>- break;
>- }
>- }
>-
>- if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
>- return -EINVAL;
>-
> if (!options->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
>+ hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
>+ if (hash)
>+ return hash;
>+
> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>--
>2.52.0
J.
--
Design a system any fool can use, and only a fool will want to use it.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists