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Message-ID: <aS1CU5ISRK8yTfpA@inspiron>
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 12:52:59 +0530
From: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi@...il.com>
To: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@...ux.alibaba.com>
Cc: mark@...heh.com, jlbec@...lplan.org, ocfs2-devel@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel-mentees@...ts.linux.dev,
skhan@...uxfoundation.org, david.hunter.linux@...il.com,
khalid@...nel.org,
syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: ocfs2: fix kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain
On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 03:07:56PM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
>
>
>On 2025/12/1 14:24, Prithvi Tambewagh wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 10:51:49AM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2025/11/30 18:46, Prithvi Tambewagh wrote:
>>>> syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() because the
>>>> `cl_next_free_rec` field of the allocation chain list is 0, triggring the
>>>> BUG_ON(!cl->cl_next_free_rec) condition and panicking the kernel.
>>>>
>>>> To fix this, `cl_next_free_rec` is checked inside the caller of
>>>> ocfs2_find_victim_chain() i.e. ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits() and if it is
>>>> equal to 0, ocfs2_error() is called, to log the corruption and force the
>>>> filesystem into read-only mode, to prevent further damage.
>>>>
>>>> Reported-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>>>> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=96d38c6e1655c1420a72
>>>> Tested-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>>>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>>>> Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi@...il.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 7 +++++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
>>>> index 6ac4dcd54588..84bb2d11c2aa 100644
>>>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
>>>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
>>>> @@ -1993,6 +1993,13 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(struct ocfs2_alloc_context *ac,
>>>>
>>>> cl = (struct ocfs2_chain_list *) &fe->id2.i_chain;
>>>>
>>>
>>> This blank line can be eliminated.
>>>
>>>> + if (le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) == 0) {
>>>
>>> Better to add the upper limit check as well. e.g.
>>>
>>> !le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) ||
>>> le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) > le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count)
>>
>> Hello Joseph,
>>
>> I went through the code in fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c, like this function
>> static inline u16 ocfs2_find_smallest_chain(struct ocfs2_chain_list *cl)
>> {
>> u16 curr, best;
>>
>> best = curr = 0;
>> while (curr < le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count)) {
>> if (le32_to_cpu(cl->cl_recs[best].c_total) >
>> le32_to_cpu(cl->cl_recs[curr].c_total))
>> best = curr;
>> curr++;
>> }
>> return best;
>> }
>>
>> and in function ocfs2_block_group_alloc() these lines
>> if (le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) < le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count))
>> le16_add_cpu(&cl->cl_next_free_rec, 1);
>>
>After this, cl_next_free_rec may equal to cl_count.
>
>
>> and observed that according to the architecture of ocfs2, the chain list is in the form of 0-indexed array. In that case, the change you suggested for upper limit, could be re-written as
>> le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) >= le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count)
>>
>> since value of cl->cl_next_free_rec greater than or equal to cl->cl_count will indicate that there are no available chains. Can you please review this?
>>
>Yes, it's full. But 'cl_next_free_rec == cl_count' is a designed behavior, see mkfs or fsck.
I get it. We are trying to catch a state of disk corruption, so your
suggestion
le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) > le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count)
fits best here. Thanks...I will make v2 for the patch.
Best Reards,
Prithvi
>
>Joseph
>
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