lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <7917b0db-82b7-4a75-91cd-d3b6b0364728@molgen.mpg.de>
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 14:18:29 +0100
From: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@...gen.mpg.de>
To: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@...il.com>
Cc: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@...el.com>,
 Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@...el.com>,
 "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
 Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@...el.com>,
 intel-wired-lan@...ts.osuosl.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
 Tony Nguyen <tony.nguyen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [Intel-wired-lan] [PATCH v2] e1000: fix OOB in
 e1000_tbi_should_accept()

Dear Guangshuo,


Thank you for your patch.

Am 01.12.25 um 04:40 schrieb Guangshuo Li:
> In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
> 'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
> reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
> read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
> is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
> 
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
> Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363
> 
> CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
>   <IRQ>
>   dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74
>   print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
>   print_report+0x101/0x200
>   kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
>   e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
>   e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110
>   e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10
>   __napi_poll+0x98/0x380
>   net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20
>   __do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d
>   do_softirq+0xd1/0x120
>   </IRQ>
>   <TASK>
>   __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130
>   ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00
>   __ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0
>   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340
>   tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0
>   __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280
>   tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0
>   tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40
>   sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430
>   vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60
>   ksys_write+0xd1/0x190
>   do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10
> Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24
> RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10
> RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003
> RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00
> R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003
>   </TASK>
> Allocated by task 1:
>   __kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0
>   krealloc+0x90/0xc0
>   add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0
>   kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4
>   param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6
>   param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b
>   do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250
>   do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132
>   do_initcalls+0x46/0x74
>   kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393
>   kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0
>   ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000
>   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
> The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of
>   2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800]
> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110
> head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
> flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
> raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> ==================================================================
> 
> This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last
> byte without validating the reported length first:
> 
> 	u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
> 
> Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds
> adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for
> valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer.

Do you have reproducer to forth an invalid length?

> Fixes: 2037110c96d5 ("e1000: move tbi workaround code into helper function")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Suggested-by: Tony Nguyen <tony.nguyen@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@...il.com>
> ---
> changelog:
> v2:
> - Keep declarations at the beginning of e1000_tbi_should_accept().
> - Move the last_byte assignment after the length bounds checks (suggested by Tony Nguyen)
> ---
>   drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 9 ++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
> index 3f5feb55cfba..cb49ec49f836 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
> @@ -4091,7 +4091,14 @@ static bool e1000_tbi_should_accept(struct e1000_adapter *adapter,
>   				    u32 length, const u8 *data)
>   {
>   	struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
> -	u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
> +	u8 last_byte;
> +	/* Guard against OOB on data[length - 1] */
> +	if (unlikely(!length))
> +		return false;
> +	/* Upper bound: length must not exceed rx_buffer_len */
> +	if (unlikely(length > adapter->rx_buffer_len))

Should an error be logged, or is it a common scenario, that such traffic 
exists?

> +		return false;
> +	last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
>   
>   	if (TBI_ACCEPT(hw, status, errors, length, last_byte)) {
>   		unsigned long irq_flags;


Kind regards,

Paul

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ