linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i

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Message-ID: <8ede6a79-adb8-4b89-a8c2-d0cf57ff2267@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2025 14:16:55 +0800
From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@...ux.alibaba.com>
To: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@...e.com>,
 Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@...il.com>
Cc: mark@...heh.com, jlbec@...lplan.org, ocfs2-devel@...ts.linux.dev,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, david.hunter.linux@...il.com,
 skhan@...uxfoundation.org,
 syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
 Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block
 read



On 2025/12/2 14:15, Heming Zhao wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 06:52:14AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
>> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
>> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>>
>> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
>> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
>> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
>> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
>> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>>
>> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
>> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>>
>> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
>> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
>> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
>> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
>> the cache.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
>> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@...il.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@...il.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@...il.com>
>> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
>> ---
>> v2:
>>  - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
>>  - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
>>  - Tested with ocfs2-test
>> ---
>> v3:
>>  - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
>> ---
>> v4:
>>  - Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
>>   to save few cpu cycles
>> ---
>> v5:
>>  - Clear i_links_count check
>>  - Log the actual i_nlink/i_mode
>> ---
>>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> index 14bf440ea4df..08ce0846289c 100644
>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> @@ -1456,6 +1456,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>>  		goto bail;
>>  	}
>>  
>> +	if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
>> +		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
>> +			"Corrupt state (nlink = %u or mode = %u) detected!\n",
>> +		        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
>> +			(di->i_links_count_hi | di->i_links_count), di->i_mode);
> 
> The '|' logic is meaningless here. Because the error case is rare, you can simply
> call ocfs2_read_links_count(di).
> 
Yes, also 'di->i_mode' should be converted to cpu endian as well.

Joseph