lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CA+fCnZdzBdC4hdjOLa5U_9g=MhhBfNW24n+gHpYNqW8taY_Vzg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 16:53:01 +0100
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
To: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@...me>, jiayuan.chen@...ux.dev
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, 
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>, stable@...r.kernel.org, 
	Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] kasan: Unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag

On Tue, Dec 2, 2025 at 3:29 PM Maciej Wieczor-Retman
<m.wieczorretman@...me> wrote:
>
> From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>
>
> A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
> on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
> It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
> the following points:
>
>         1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
>         2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
>         3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
>            the tag of the first chunk.
>         4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
>            first chunk.
>         5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
>            match that of the first chunk.
>
> Use the modified __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() to pass the tag of the first
> vm_struct's address when vm_structs are unpoisoned in
> pcpu_get_vm_areas(). Assigning a common tag resolves the pcpu chunk
> address mismatch.
>
> Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 6.1+
> Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>
> ---
> Changelog v2:
> - Revise the whole patch to match the fixed refactorization from the
>   first patch.
>
> Changelog v1:
> - Rewrite the patch message to point at the user impact of the issue.
> - Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes.
>
>  mm/kasan/common.c  |  3 ++-
>  mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 12 ++++++++----
>  mm/kasan/shadow.c  | 15 +++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 7884ea7d13f9..e5a867a5670b 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -591,11 +591,12 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
>         unsigned long size;
>         void *addr;
>         int area;
> +       u8 tag = get_tag(vms[0]->addr);
>
>         for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
>                 size = vms[area]->size;
>                 addr = vms[area]->addr;
> -               vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(addr, size, flags);
> +               vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(addr, size, flags, tag);

I'm thinking what you can do here is:

vms[area]->addr = set_tag(addr, tag);
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags | KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);

This is with the assumption that Jiayuan's patch is changed to add
KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG to kasan_vmalloc_flags_t.

Then you should not need that extra __kasan_random_unpoison_vmalloc helper.


>         }
>  }
>  #endif
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
> index 4b7936a2bd6f..2a02b898b9d8 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
> @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static void init_vmalloc_pages(const void *start, unsigned long size)
>  }
>
>  static void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
> -                                     kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
> +                                     kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, int unpoison_tag)
>  {
>         u8 tag;
>         unsigned long redzone_start, redzone_size;
> @@ -361,7 +361,11 @@ static void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
>                 return (void *)start;
>         }
>
> -       tag = kasan_random_tag();
> +       if (unpoison_tag < 0)
> +               tag = kasan_random_tag();
> +       else
> +               tag = unpoison_tag;
> +
>         start = set_tag(start, tag);
>
>         /* Unpoison and initialize memory up to size. */
> @@ -390,7 +394,7 @@ static void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
>  void *__kasan_random_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
>                                       kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
>  {
> -       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags);
> +       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags, -1);
>  }
>
>  void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> @@ -405,7 +409,7 @@ void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
>  void *__kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(void *addr, unsigned long size,
>                                   kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, u8 tag)
>  {
> -       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
> +       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags, tag);
>  }
>  #endif
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index 0a8d8bf6e9cf..7a66ffc1d5b3 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -625,8 +625,10 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>  }
>
>  static void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
> -                                     kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
> +                                     kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, int unpoison_tag)
>  {
> +       u8 tag;
> +
>         /*
>          * Software KASAN modes unpoison both VM_ALLOC and non-VM_ALLOC
>          * mappings, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is ignored.
> @@ -648,7 +650,12 @@ static void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
>             !(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL))
>                 return (void *)start;
>
> -       start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
> +       if (unpoison_tag < 0)
> +               tag = kasan_random_tag();
> +       else
> +               tag = unpoison_tag;
> +
> +       start = set_tag(start, tag);
>         kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
>         return (void *)start;
>  }
> @@ -656,13 +663,13 @@ static void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
>  void *__kasan_random_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
>                                       kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
>  {
> -       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags);
> +       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags, -1);
>  }
>
>  void *__kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(void *addr, unsigned long size,
>                                   kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, u8 tag)
>  {
> -       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
> +       return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags, tag);
>  }
>
>  /*
> --
> 2.52.0
>
>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ